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The South African Government’s anti-poverty strategy has been largely dominated by unconditional 
cash transfers. A growing body of literature examines the impacts of these transfers on a range of 
socio-economic outcomes; however there is little discussion of why such impacts are important. 
Without an explicit conceptual framework within which to examine these effects, evaluating their 
likely long term poverty impacts remains problematic. The focus of this research is to distil the 
current thinking on poverty and social protection to establish an appropriate theoretical framework 
within which to appraise anti-poverty measures. An ‘Assets-Augmented’ Capabilities Framework is 
proposed with a focus on asset-building as the primary means of poverty reduction. Focusing on the 
Child Support Grant (CSG), empirical analysis is then applied to examine whether the underlying 
causes of poverty are being addressed. Using the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 1 
Dataset, the effects of the CSG on households’ expenditure patterns are examined to assess the 
extent to which CSG-recipients invest in asset-building. A propensity score matching method is 
employed to construct an appropriate counterfactual. Households receiving the CSG are not found 
to exhibit significantly different expenditure patterns compared to a control group and cannot 
therefore be argued to invest differently in assets. This key finding provides evidence that the CSG 
primarily addresses the symptoms of poverty and cannot be expected to generate sustainable 
poverty reduction. A ‘linking’ approach is thus proposed to combine the cash transfer element of 
the grant with more explicitly promotional measures in order to seek greater asset effects. A key 
recommendation is to ensure that the CSG acts as a gateway to other complementary services and 
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South Africa, with a population of 49 million, exhibits the largest and most sophisticated economy 
in Africa and is well positioned to compete internationally in many industrial sectors. However, 
with a Human Development Index (HDI) rank of 129 in 2009 (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2009), there is no doubt that South Africa is underperforming for a country of its 
income levels. A history of resource-led growth and apartheid policies has resulted in an economy 
characterised by high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality existing concomitantly with 
globally competitive industries (Mayer & Altman, 2005). Consequently, South Africa has become 
one of the most unequal societies in the world: the Gini coefficient, which provides a measure of 
income inequality, was estimated at 0.67 in 2009 (The Presidency, 2009)1. Poverty is a major 
problem throughout the country with the percentage of the population living below a R283 per 
month poverty line reaching 22% in 2008 (ibid.: 26). 
 
In attempting to address poverty in South Africa, the national government has chosen a strategy 
largely focused on unconditional cash transfers (Republic of South Africa, 2009b). While these 
grants appear to have been relatively successful in alleviating income poverty among recipients 
and thereby easing the symptoms of poverty, what is less clear is what effect social grants are 
having on the underlying causes of poverty. In order to understand the likely impact on longer 
term poverty reduction, as opposed to current poverty alleviation, this distinction is critical.  
 
There is a growing literature examining various impacts of South Africa’s social grants, for example 
health, schooling and employment outcomes (see Section 3.2). However, given that the purpose of 
these grants is, first and foremost, to provide income support (Republic of South Africa, 2009b), it 
is interesting to note that within this literature there is no discussion of the rationale for examining 
these non-monetary impacts. While it may seem obvious that such analyses are warranted, it is 
important that any evaluation of programme impacts, whether direct or indirect, can establish a 
clear justification for why these impacts are important, rather than simply presenting them in 
isolation. Otherwise, the relevance of the findings may be unnecessarily undermined.  
 
Accordingly, the overall goal of this paper is twofold: to attempt to fill this gap by developing a 
sound conceptual framework within which social grants can be appraised; and to examine the 
likely longer term poverty impacts of the grants system. Focusing on the Child Support Grant (CSG), 
                                                      
 














this analysis will assess the extent to which the CSG is performing a ‘promotional’ role by 
enhancing the capabilities of recipients to make choices about their future. Two research tools will 
be employed to achieve these objectives: a critical review of the relevant literature will inform the 
construction of a conceptual framework; and a quantitative analysis of empirical data will be used 
to assess the longer term poverty effects of the CSG. The specific research method applied is 
discussed in depth in Section 4.  
 
To develop a conceptual framework within which to situate the social grants literature, it is first 
necessary to examine the evolution of the concept of poverty to establish exactly what these cash 
transfers are attempting to deal with. Having done so, the concept of social protection, which 
encompasses unconditional cash transfers, can be explored with a view to establishing a 
reasonable benchmark against which to appraise the CSG. Only once this conceptual framework 
has been constructed and a clear idea of what anti-poverty measures such as the CSG are actually 
trying to do is it appropriate to examine the impacts of the grant on the long term poverty 
situation in South Africa.  
 
The specific objectives of this research are thus to: 
 
1. Examine the evolution of the concept of poverty; 
2. Critically assess the role of social protection in addressing poverty; 
3. Construct a logical and relevant conceptual framework within which to appraise the 
poverty impacts of South Africa’s social grants; 
4. Establish the current poverty situation in South Africa; 
5. Analyse the likely impact of CSG receipt on future poverty reduction in South Africa; 
6. Formulate options for enhancing the poverty impacts of the CSG. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 will first tackle Objectives 1 and 2 by examining 
the broad literature on poverty and social protection before addressing Objective 3; in so doing, 
this section will contextualise the subsequent empirical analysis, as well as the broader social 
grants literature. Section 3 will then address Objective 4 by briefly outlining the poverty situation in 
South Africa since the end of Apartheid and reviewing the main policy tools that have been 
employed in attempting to tackle it. Section 4 will outline the method used in the expenditure 
analysis before the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 then focuses on what these results 
mean for asset-building and the longer term escape from poverty; these three sections collectively 
contribute to Objective 5. In response to Objective 6, Section 7 will present a brief review of three 














before using these experiences to inform a range of options for expanding the CSG. Section 8 
concludes.   
 
This research will contribute to the South African social grants literature in three distinct ways: 
firstly, by developing a coherent conceptual framework it will contextualise the existing literature 
by providing the previously unstated rationale for appraising the socio-economic impacts of the 
grants, as well as developing a framework within which to situate future analyses; secondly, having 
demonstrated the importance of assets for sustainable poverty reduction, the empirical analysis 
will examine the extent to which the CSG can be expected to generate such longer term poverty 
















2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To situate my analysis within the broader poverty reduction literature and establish the conceptual 
framework that will inform the remainder of this study, I will first review the evolution of the 
concept of poverty, as a clear understanding of what is meant by this term will be crucial to the 
subsequent analysis. I will then turn to an examination of the role of social protection as an anti-
poverty measure in order to establish a benchmark against which South Africa’s CSG can be 
examined. In terms of the specific objectives of this study, this section will address Objectives 1-3 
as detailed in Section 1.  
2.1 WHAT DO WE MEAN BY POVERTY? FROM TRICKLE DOWN TO CAPABILITIES 
 
As articulated by Kanbur and Squire (2001), the definition of poverty has evolved dramatically since 
development economics emerged as a discipline. Beginning with an initial focus on monetary 
income, the notion of poverty grew to reflect the multiple dimensions of wellbeing; first by 
embracing additional aspects of living standards, such as literacy and health, before developing 
further to reflect an improved understanding of the problems of vulnerability and social and 
political exclusion. As the understanding of poverty has expanded to recognise the multiple 
dimensions of deprivation, research has frequently found little overlap between these different 
facets (Cling et al., 2003), such that focusing solely on income is now widely regarded as 
insufficient. The complex nature of this refined understanding of poverty is particularly well 
elucidated in the freedom-cent ed capabilities approach (CA) to development advocated by 
Amartya Sen and others.  
 
The CA represents an important shift in thinking about development by recasting development not 
as increased income per capita, but rather as the enhancement of ‘substantive freedoms’ (Sen, 
1999). According to this view, development takes place when people are better able to lead the 
sort of lives they have reason to value. The CA underpins the United Nations’s Human 
Development Reports and has become a dominant perspective among development theorists and 
practitioners. The concept of capabilities offers a unique evaluative framework, viewing justice as 
equality in the space of capabilities. Sen (1999) notes that the expansion of freedom is both the 
end and the means of development and that the growth of one kind of freedom often promotes 















Development, rather than focusing on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, becomes 
concerned with expanding individual freedoms, thereby applying a more human-centred view. Of 
course income remains extremely important in a capabilities view of development but it is 
instrumentally valuable to development, rather than an end in itself. The CA is also unique in 
focusing on individual agency, rather than seeing people as passive recipients of development 
projects. Within this framework, the beneficiaries of development interventions are recognised as 
active agents of change, capable of affecting their own lives and societies. People are at the heart 
of development and the focus is shifted to what they are able to do and to be, rather than how 
much income they have.  
 
The CA has diverse roots in the work of Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Aristotle and shares some 
principles with the work of John Rawls, in its focus on freedom of choice. However, Sen rejected 
Rawls’s focus on primary commodities, instead emphasising the heterogeneity of people and 
recognising that a person’s capabilities are determined not just by endowments of goods and 
services but also by personal, social and structural ‘conversion factors’ that allow people to 
transform those goods into capability sets from which they can then choose a set of functionings 
(Sen, 1985).  
 
This recognition that tackling poverty requires simultaneous attention to both initial endowments 
and the ability to convert these into capabilities is largely what sets the CA apart from its 
predecessors: the focus on GDP per capita encouraged policies aimed at raising growth; 
subsequent attention to redistribution introduced measures for more equitable distribution of 
existing resources; but only the CA recognises the concurrent need to focus on conversion factors 
to achieve equality in the space of capabilities. Figure 1 provides a simple representation of this 
conversion of initial endowments of the means to achieve into achieved functionings in the CA.  
 























2.1.1 Practical application 
 
While the CA provides a theoretically attractive approach to understanding poverty, the 
framework is often considered difficult to operationalise, thereby diminishing its practical value. 
Sen, in contrast to fellow CA advocate, Martha Nussbaum, has always refused to specify a list of 
capabilities that should be pursued; arguing instead that the explicit objectives of any nation 
following a CA methodology must be set by the democratic process rather than prescribed by 
theorists (Sen, 2004). This debate has important implications for the practical applicability of the 
approach as an anti-poverty framework. In a critique of Sen’s work, Navarro (2000) stresses the 
importance of ordering the freedoms according to priority. Indeed, without an explicit list of 
capabilities the value of Sen’s approach as a direct guide to policymaking is somewhat limited. 
Nonetheless Sen’s assertion that the precise priorities of any given state should be determined 
from within is a valid one, as social, political and cultural context is vital in determining an 
appropriate path for development.  
 
Rather than the lack of a prescribed capabilities list, I would argue that the main practical limitation 
of the CA lies in the somewhat nebulous and intangible concept of capabilities. A person’s 
capabilities cannot be observed, only the functionings that they select from the opportunities 
available to them. An adult without a job, for example, may be excluded from the labour market in 
a way that restricts their capability to work; or they may simply be choosing leisure over paid work. 
Without being able to measure capabilities directly, it is difficult to ascertain what effect policies 
are having on them. Moreover, Sen argues that the substantive freedoms are not substitutable but 
rather progress must be made in all dimensions. In reality, however, policymakers will be faced 
with trade-offs between different objectives due to competing demands upon scarce resources. In 
order for the CA in its current form to influence decision making, some degree of trade-off must 
therefore be accepted, yet the theoretical literature offers little guidance on how to make such 
decisions.  
 
The difficulty in implementing the CA in practice highlights an important distinction between the 
needs of policymakers and those of theorists in the field of development: while academic 
discussion of a capabilities approach may be content to focus on why policy should look beyond 
economic growth and focus on enhancing the capabilities of the poor; the practical application of 
the approach requires explicit detail of how this is best achieved. A constructive poverty 
framework requires both a strong theoretical rationale and clear practical applicability to 
policymaking, yet it seems that the CA may have developed somewhat unevenly in these 














frameworks that preceded it, the weaknesses of the CA are not sufficiently damaging to reject it 
outright, but rather provide grounds to further develop it into a more workable form.  
 
2.1.2 The Role of Assets  
 
Combining the CA with asset-based approaches to poverty might offer one way to do just that. 
Unlike the concept of capabilities, assets are more tangible and easier to observe in practice. Asset 
theory contends that asset ownership provides individuals and households with considerable 
social, economic and psychological benefits as well as enhancing stability and self-esteem (Curley 
et al., 2009). Closely related to the CA, this view sees capabilities ‘to be and to do’ as stemming 
from an individual, household or community’s asset holdings (Bebbington, 1999). The extensive 
asset literature generally defines an asset as a “stock of financial, human, natural or social 
resources that can be acquired, developed, improved and transferred across generations” (Ford 
Foundation, 2004: 9). Household assets are important in understanding poverty dynamics as well 
as providing a more forward-looking appreciation of poverty than basic income measures can 
offer. Assets generate agency for the holder in a way that income per se does not. A lack of assets, 
or constraints on the capacity to utilise what assets are held, can lead to an individual or household 
experiencing poverty (Carter & May, 2001). 
 
An important feature in the evolution of the concept of poverty has been the recognition, largely 
through the participatory approaches popular in the 1990s, of the importance of risk and 
vulnerability to people’s lives (Narayan et al., 2000). It is often argued (e.g. Barrientos et al., 2005; 
Holzmann & Kozel, 2007) that income poverty imposes a ‘vicious circle’ whereby the poor are 
unable to pursue high-risk/ high-return activities as they lack the buffers necessary to cushion 
themselves against potential loss. Indeed one of the main arguments in favour of providing cash 
transfers, such as the CSG, is that even a small amount of regular income can provide the means to 
invest in riskier opportunities (Alderman & Hoddinott, 2007). However, the relationship between 
poverty and risk behaviour may not be as simple as low income perpetuating itself through risk 
aversion. Mosely and Verschoor (2005) find risk aversion to be largely unrelated to income levels 
whereas a strong link is found between risk behaviour and assets. Using experimental techniques, 
the authors find evidence that low returns on assets contribute to keeping asset levels low, thus 
affecting the ability to manage risk, which in turn affects income poverty.  
 
This finding that low asset levels perpetuate poverty is supported by Carter and Barrett (2006), 














expenditure poverty lines through to their fourth generation dynamic asset poverty threshold. The 
literature on asset thresholds argues that there is some critical threshold in the space of assets 
below which escape from poverty is virtually impossible without outside intervention (Carter & 
Barrett, 2006). While this argument could be regarded as somewhat simplistic in that it implicitly 
assumes all assets can readily be aggregated into a single measure (Dercon, 2007), the implications 
of an asset threshold remain valid and important, regardless of whether a numerical value can be 
applied.  
 
Assets come in many forms, including physical and health human capital assets which can be 
classified as ‘protective’ or ‘preventative’ by providing a vital cushion against shocks that might 
otherwise push households into poverty. Financial or educational human capital assets, on the 
other hand, can be considered ‘promotional’, in that they can actually lead to improvements in a 
household’s poverty status and ultimately facilitate escape from poverty (Moser, 2006). Assets are 
argued to provide positive ‘asset effects’ in excess of their financial value as those holding assets 
expect to enjoy greater wellbeing in the future and thus behave differently from those expecting a 
future mired in poverty. An asset-centred approach therefore appears to offer a useful alternative 
to the CA: maintaining the multidimensionality and agency focus of the CA, while shifting the 
relevant measure of development from difficult-to-define ‘capabilities’ to the more observable 
‘assets’.  
 
However, a potential weakness of focusing on assets alone is the implicit implication within the 
literature that development policymakers and practitioners should be interested in asset-building 
for its own sake, rather than as a means to enhancing freedoms. Although this may not have a 
significant impact on policy choice, this reasoning could obscure the ultimate goal of development: 
namely, enhanced capabilities. By taking the CA as a starting point but employing assets as the 
relevant observable measure of poverty, this paper therefore combines the strengths of both 
approaches and proposes an ‘assets-augmented’ capabilities framework within which to address 
the stated research objectives. Adapting the process depicted in Figure 1, the conversion of 
endowments into functionings within this alternative framework is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Individuals convert their initial endowments, which might include net income, government 
transfers, remittances or non-market production, into a stock of assets. This is achieved through 
household expenditure directed towards asset building, as opposed to current consumption. The 
returns to these assets generate the individual’s capability set, from which they can then select 















The integration of assets into the CA adds a more concrete conception of how capabilities can be 
enhanced. Within this framework, a person’s capability set, their ability to do and to be, is 
determined by their ability to convert resources into assets through asset-building expenditure as 
well as by the returns they can expect to earn from those assets.  
 




It is worth drawing attention to an important shortcoming of the assets literature that may be 
relevant in evaluating the impacts of the CSG. Incorporating an assets perspective offers a useful 
resolution to the practical problem of non-substitutability of capabilities by shifting the objective of 
policymaking from the broad ‘expanding capabilities in all dimensions’ to the more specific 
‘protection and enhancement of assets’. However, the current asset literature could be argued to 
occupy the other extreme, in that there is an implicit assumption that ‘an asset is an asset’, 
thereby implying perfect substitutability. While it is generally recognised that assets come in many 
forms, from physical through to human capital and the more intangible social assets, policymakers 
could draw little guidance from the literature in terms of, say, whether an optimal mix of assets 
exists; whether or how certain assets should be prioritised when designing anti-poverty initiatives; 
or whether there is a role for sequencing in asset-accumulation.  
 
While the asset literature sheds little light on these questions, it is worth bearing the heterogeneity 
of assets in mind when examining the asset implications of the CSG. It is tempting to speak of 
‘assets’ as a homogeneous group, however in reality they vary in a number of important 
dimensions; such as initial investment cost, expected returns, resilience to shocks and the ability to 
transfer ownership or convert into cash. Distinctions can also be drawn between private assets 
that lie at least partly within control of the individual, and public assets that largely depend on 
state provision. With this in mind, it seems likely that a household’s chances of escaping poverty, 
and the duration of the process, depend not only on the level of assets they hold but also the 




















assets too are closely interlinked. The expansion of one asset, such as health human capital, often 
facilitates the ability to accumulate another, such as education. 
 
In light of these advances in our understanding of what it means to be poor, it is clear that any 
successful poverty reduction strategy must incorporate a multifaceted conception of poverty that 
focuses on the extent to which projects and policies can improve the lives of the poor by protecting 
and enhancing their assets. Within an assets-augmented capabilities framework, income, including 
that from social grants, is not an end in itself but rather a means to reducing poverty by expanding 
the freedoms of the recipients to make active decisions that will boost their asset holdings and, 
consequently, their ability to be and to do.  
 
2.2 WHAT IS THE ROLE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN TACKLING POVERTY? 
 
With a broader understanding of what it means to be poor, the policy levers available to tackle 
poverty naturally expand beyond those associated with a simple focus on economic growth. One 
such lever which has risen rapidly up the internation l development agenda is social protection. 
Over the last decade, social protection has become an increasingly important topic within 
international development discourse (Carter & Barrett, 2007; for a review of the factors driving the 
emergence of social protection see Guhan, 1994), partly due to the understanding that social 
protection can facilitate the achievement of larger development goals, such as economic growth or 
the Millennium Development Goals (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; Davies et al., 2008). 
Moreover, multilateral institutions have moved towards a consensus regarding the critical 
importance of social protection in developing countries for tackling poverty and vulnerability 
(Barrientos et al., 2005: 9). Yet, despite the increasing significance of social protection, there 
remains increasing disagreement about what the concept actually means (Conway & Norton, 
2002).  
 
2.2.1 Defining Social Protection 
 
Norton, Conway and Foster (2002: 543) define social protection as “public actions taken in 
response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable 
within a given polity or society”. The authors affirm that this definition refers only to measures 
intended to protect those who currently are, or are likely to fall, below acceptable livelihood levels 














standard of opportunity and livelihood for all citizens” (Norton et al., 2002: 544). This supposedly 
follows a distinction made by Drèze and Sen (1989), who recognise the dual role of what they term 
‘social security’: that is, preventing deterioration in current living conditions and actively promoting 
improved living conditions, including eradicating persistent deprivation.  
 
While this distinction is certainly useful in clarifying what a given intervention aims to do, Drèze 
and Sen (1989) rightly recognise that the two aspects, prevention and promotion, are closely 
interrelated. Norton et al. (2002), on the other hand, by restricting their conception of social 
protection to the former, seem to be taking an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of their own 
definition. Where poverty is a deficiency in ‘substantive freedoms’ and justice is determined by 
equality in the space of capabilities, a socially unacceptable level of deprivation could reasonably 
be expected to include one which precludes the capability to influence one’s own development 
through protecting and enhancing one’s asset holdings. Moreover, given the importance of 
individual, household and community agency within the CA framework, an enforced passivity due 
to confinement beneath the dynamic asset threshold is in itself an important form of deprivation 
that can and should be addressed by social protection, even within the definition offered by 
Norton et al. (2002) This paper therefore follows the definition presented above while interpreting 
it less restrictively than its authors do.  
 
2.2.1 Defining Conditionality 
 
It is important to recognise up front that the notion of ‘conditions’ as applied to social grants could 
be separated into three distinct issues. Receipt of a protective grant might be conditional on 
participation in a complementary promotional programme; conditionality could be imposed within 
each type of protective or promotional support by requiring a particular action of the recipient, 
such as attending school; or conditionality could simply refer to the qualification parameters, such 
as income level or age.  
 
The Child Support Grant in its current form is only conditional in the last sense as it is not required 
that recipients take part in any other programmes or undertake any particular actions. Throughout 
this paper, the term ‘conditional’, as applied to social protection measures, refers to the second 
type of conditionality identified. Similarly, unconditional cash transfers refer to those that do not 
require the recipient to undertake particular actions. Where disbursement of a social grant is 














a ‘promotion-dependent grant’. A grant that sets specific qualification parameters, as opposed to 
universal provision, will be referred to as ‘targeted’. 
 
2.2.3 Can Social Protection Address Chronic Poverty? 
 
The debate between broad versus narrow conceptions of social protection is broadly akin to the 
question of whether social protection measures are capable of, or indeed appropriate for, 
addressing chronic poverty. While a protective-only framework could benefit the chronic poor by 
keeping them above some socially-determined level of ‘acceptable’ deprivation, it would, by 
definition, stop short of actively supporting these households to ‘get ahead’. In other words, 
protective measures can alleviate the symptoms of poverty by, say, providing income support or 
protection of existing livelihoods, but they are unlikely to tackle the root causes that perpetuate 
poverty. Within a broader social protection framework, however, there becomes a clear role for 
addressing chronic poverty (Barrientos et al., 2005; Devereux, 2002). Moreover, as Devereux 
(2002) observes, due to the fungibility of household income, while the distinction between 
‘protective’ and ‘promotional’ measures may be straightforward in theory, in reality any transfer 
can be directed towards current consumption or productive investment, or various combinations 
of both.  
 
So social protection measures such as targeted cash transfers can, at least in theory, have an 
impact on chronic poverty via asset-building by providing recipients with the means to invest in 
their own future. However, the extent to which this will take place in reality may be affected by a 
number of factors; not least the presence of asset poverty traps that hold the poor in low asset 
equilibria. As Dercon (2007: 40) points out, in the presence of asset poverty traps, “regular small 
transfers have zero impact in terms of chronic poverty” because, unless transfers are sufficiently 
large to overcome the threshold, recipients simply absorb the additional income and quickly fall 
back to the initial equilibrium.  
 
Carter and May (2001) contend that the distinction between chronic and transitory poverty is 
misleading and what policymakers should focus on is the distinction between stochastic and 
structural poverty. The former refers to households or individuals that are observed to be poor 
based on consumption measures but hold asset levels in excess of the asset poverty line. Structural 
poverty, on the other hand, occurs when assets held lie below the asset poverty line. A critical 
difference between the groups is that the stochastically poor can be expected to eventually escape 














underlying social, economic or political structures in order to do so. This more nuanced view of 
poverty fits well within a CA approach, which recognises the importance not just of endowments of 
goods and services but also the critical role of structural conversion factors that determine the 
returns that can be obtained from these and therefore the likelihood of escaping poverty. As 
Devereux (2002) concludes, “cash injections without structural transformation mean unsustainable 
outcomes.” The pertinent question for this study, then, is whether this structural change can come 
from household agency effects generated by cash transfers or whether it must come from 
additional, parallel measures. 
 
2.3 SUMMARY AND RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH METHODS  
 
The CSG provides much-needed cash transfers to low-income families with children thereby giving 
much-needed and reliable assistance to vulnerable people. Given this, rather than discussing 
expenditure impacts for their own sake, it is important to be explicit about why we actually care 
about the impacts of the grant beyond the income support function. As the current literature on 
South African social grants does not answer this question explicitly, this paper has attempted to 
construct an appropriate conceptual framework that distils current thinking about poverty and 
social protection in order to conceptualise the role of social grants and provide a means by which 
to appraise their impacts. Within the framework developed, grant income, like any other source of 
income, provides a means to reducing poverty by expanding assets and, in turn, the ability to be 
and to do. Examining the extent to which this impact is realised will thus provide insight into the 
question of whether grants are addressing the causes or merely the symptoms of poverty. 
 
Even if the CSG is found to have no significant impact on the expenditure patterns of recipient 
households, it remains the case that, in the absence of the grant, these households would be 
consuming or investing less than they otherwise do. Nevertheless, if, as the literature suggests, 
even those social protection mechanisms intended to be preventative can bring about promotional 
outcomes, it is pertinent to ask whether the CSG in its current form is one such mechanism, as this 
has important ramifications for the likelihood of recipient families eventually escaping poverty. 
Moreover, within this conceptual framework, which sees the inability to influence one’s own 
development through asset-building as an aspect of poverty, there is an important overlap 
between protection and promotion. 
 
An asset-based framework recognises that social and economic development cannot focus solely 














resources necessary for longer term development. While income support can provide invaluable 
assistance to the poorest households, cash transfers alone may not be adequate to strengthen the 
recipient’s capacity to shape his or her own future and address these longer term objectives. The 
literature on asset thresholds and poverty traps thus provides further rationale for investigating 
the asset impacts of the grant. Doing so can provide insights into whether the CSG is lifting 
recipient households over the threshold, wherever that may lie, or whether they are generally 
remaining at low asset equilibria after grant receipt. If CSG recipient households are not found to 
invest more in assets, this could indicate the presence of an asset poverty trap which the grant is 
not large enough to overcome. In this case, the CSG operating in isolation may be addressing the 
















3. THE POVERTY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Turning now to Objective 4 as described in Section 1, this section will briefly review the poverty 
situation in South Africa in the post-Apartheid era and the broad policy responses attempting to 
address it; specifically presenting an outline of the history of the system of social grants in South 
African. The CSG, a key component of the social grants system, which has become the leading anti-
poverty device during this period, will then be introduced before reviewing the existing literature 
on this transfer in light of the conceptual framework developed in the preceding section. This 
contextual discussion will set the scene for the subsequent empirical analysis and, by providing a 
clear overview of the current position, it will establish the magnitude and complexity of the 
poverty problem facing South Africa today. 
 
3.1 BACKGROUND: POVERTY AND POLICY 
 
Following the end of Apartheid in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) administration 
inherited a legacy of striking inequalities between racial groups2 with huge structural disparities in 
basic infrastructure and service delivery as well as high crime rates and escalating prevalence of 
HIV/ AIDS (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006). The country has since made considerable progress on 
several key macroeconomic indicators, with GDP growth averaging 3% between 1994 and 2003, 
rising to over 4% each year until the onset of the global recession in 2008 (McGrath & Akoojee, 
2007). Nevertheless, South Africa’s consistently poor performance in global comparisons of 
poverty and inequality indicators belies its status as an upper middle income country3.  
 
There is some disagreement in the literature regarding poverty trends between 1994 and 2000, 
with some finding an increase and other work finding a reduction, although the latter tends to 
show that, although incidence has fallen, the depth of poverty has worsened (Leibbrandt et al., 
2010: 17). Since 2000, the consensus seems to be that money-metric poverty has declined but not 
substantially. Non-money measures of poverty provide a relatively more positive picture with 
evidence that access to services such as housing, water and electricity have improved substantially 
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 This paper will follow the convention in the local literature by referring to four major population groups: Africans, 
Coloureds, Asians/Indians and Whites. 
3
 South Africa had a GDP per capita of US$9,757 in purchasing power parity terms in 2008 (United Nations 














in the post-Apartheid period although access to key services remains divided along racial lines 
(ibid.). 
 
South Africa’s long run development trajectory has generated one of the most unequal societies in 
the world, with a strong racial dimension to that inequality. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) demonstrate 
that average real incomes rose for all population groups between 1994 and 2008, including for 
Africans, the poorest group. Nonetheless, many of this group remain in acute poverty and, 
regardless of the poverty line used, “Africans are very much poorer than Coloureds who are very 
much poorer than Asians/ Indians, who are poorer than whites” (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 9). The 
geographic and human capital legacies of the Apartheid era have proven extremely difficult to 
reverse and these features continue to affect the human development potential of most South 
Africans.  
 
An important issue in both international and South African poverty literature is the extent to which 
experienced poverty among citizens is chronic; that is, how far households are restricted from 
getting ahead by various ‘poverty traps’ (Aliber, 2003: 473). Applying the work of Carter and 
Barrett (2006), Adato, Carter and May (2006) analyse asset dynamics between 1993 and 1998 and 
find evidence of a dynamic asset poverty threshold in South Africa. This work suggests bifurcated 
asset accumulation, pushing those below the threshold to a low level equilibrium from which it is 
difficult to escape. Similarly, Woolard and Klasen (2005) analyse income mobility in the same 
period and find four types of poverty trap, relating to household size, education level, employment 
access and asset levels. These findings highlight the critical importance of addressing underlying 
structural inequities if significant inroads are to be made in tackling the many dimensions of 
poverty experienced in South Africa.   
 
Soon after the 1994 election, the government outlined its plans to address the inequalities of the 
past in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which afforded top priority to 
providing access to healthcare, education, employment and land but offered little detail on the 
country’s macroeconomic direction (Aliber, 2003: 475). Two years later the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) framework, a standard export-driven macroeconomic formula for 
growth, was launched, superseding RDP as the primary focus of government activity (Aliber, 2003). 
GEAR, however, was premised on strong assumptions about expected GDP and employment 
growth rates that did not materialise (Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006).  
 
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), published in 2006, 














2014 (Republic of South Africa, 2006). ASGISA recognises that, despite economic growth and the 
rollout of a social grant programme, a significant proportion of South African households remain 
unable to benefit directly from the economic development of the country.  
 
With the realisation that significant inroads in poverty reduction are yet to be achieved, a Draft 
Anti Poverty Strategy (APS) was released in 2009 by The Presidency. This document rightly 
recognises that “systemic changes” are needed and that these must “bring about more equitable 
access to assets and education” (Republic of South Africa, 2009b: 3). On paper, the APS 
acknowledges the main cause of poverty to be reduced asset bases (ibid.: 21). It is unfortunate 
therefore that no detail is given on how these asset bases will in fact be strengthened. The closest 
the APS comes to specific policies once again follows a standard neoclassical growth path, seeking 
a “high rate of savings and investment and rising productivity” (Republic of South Africa, 2009b: 
28). 
 
3.2 SOCIAL GRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In parallel to the various macroeconomic strategies intended to grow the economy, the post-
Apartheid government has launched “a bewildering array of anti-poverty initiatives, programs, and 
projects” (Aliber, 2003: 483). However, government efforts to tackle indigence directly have 
focused predominantly on a system of unconditional social grants for vulnerable groups. Given the 
failure of post-Apartheid South Africa’s macroeconomic strategies to generate substantial 
reductions in poverty and deprivation, these social grants remain the principal weapon in the fight 
against poverty. Consequently, and having established the potential of social protection measures 
to tackle chronic poverty in Section 2.2, this paper is concerned with the likely long term effects of 
these cash transfers. The stated aim of the social protection system is a largely protective role, 
with income security cited as the primary rationale for the transfers (Republic of South Africa, 
2009a: 6). However, the distinction between protection and promotion is not always 
straightforward and, to understand the potential of the CSG to address the underlying causes of 
poverty, it is important to look beyond the intended protective role to investigate whether any 
promotional impacts can be detected. 
 
The post-Apartheid government inherited a well-developed system of social grants, atypical of 
middle income countries (Van der Berg, 1997). Since then, social protection provisions have been 
actively reformed and extended (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 52). The system of means tested 














established to provide social security to the white minority, but was later extended to cover all 
population groups. Total expenditure on social grants transfers has risen from R57 billion in 2006-
07 to R71 billion in 2008-09, representing around 3.2% of GDP (South African National Treasury, 
2010: 105).  
3.2.1 The Child Support Grant 
 
The CSG was introduced in 1998, replacing the State Maintenance Grant following the 
recommendations of the Lund Committee. The CSG is administered by the South African Social 
Security Agency (SASSA) and originally involved a number of conditionalities, with recipients 
expected to take part in various ‘development programmes’ and demonstrate that the beneficiary 
children were up to date with immunisations. These conditions were subsequently dropped when 
it became clear that such services were simply not available to many applicants (Woolard & 
Leibbrandt, 2010).  
 
At its introduction the grant provided R100 per month to the primary caregiver of children under 
seven. The means test was initially based on household income but later revised to consider only 
the personal income of the caregiver and his or her spouse. Between 1998 and 2008 the means 
test did not change in nominal terms but a reform in 2008 changed it to ten times the value of the 
grant, such that it rises in line with the grant value (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 54). The grant is 
currently R250 per month per child, thus the means test value is R2,500.  
 
The age limit for CSG eligibility has similarly been adjusted over time, with the initial limit of 7 
being extended to cover those up to age 9 in 2003, 11 in 2004, 14 in 2005 and 15 in 2008 (ibid: 54). 
As of January 2010, the eligible age was extended to 18 thereby substantially increasing the 
number of qualifying families. In 2008-09 8.8 million children benefited from the CSG nationally, 
making it by far the biggest social grant in terms of reach (South African National Treasury, 2010: 
105). Delany et al. (2008: 51) estimate that around 69 per cent of CSG recipients collect the grant 
in cash each month and 27 per cent have the money paid into a bank account. 
 
There is a growing body of literature concerned with assessing the impacts of social grants, 
although this has largely focused on the Social Old Age Pension (SOAP) to date4. The SOAP has a 
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 For example, Posel et al (2006) look at the effects of household SOAP receipt on migrant labour and find a positive 














considerably larger cash value, set at a maximum of R1,080 per month from April 2010 (South 
African Government Services, 2009). A number of studies have estimated the expenditure effects 
of this grant5 although similar analysis has not yet been carried out on the CSG. Given that the CSG 
carries a substantially lower cash value but reaches over three times as many beneficiaries (South 
African National Treasury, 2010: 105) as well as targeting an entirely different subset of the 
population, it cannot be assumed that the expenditure impacts would mirror those of the SOAP. 
Moreover, given this paper’s focus on asset-building, it could be argued that households containing 
young children are of more interest in terms of examining the likely long term effects than those 
containing pensioners; notwithstanding the substantial overlaps between the two.  
 
The studies focusing on the CSG have analysed various socio-economic indicators, such as school 
enrolment, nutrition and health outcomes, which all have the potential to generate positive long 
term feedback effects for the next generation. For example Case, Hosegood and Lund (2005) 
examine data from KwaZulu-Natal and find that grant recipient children are significantly more 
likely to be enrolled in school than similarly aged children of comparable poverty levels; Woolard, 
Carter and Agüero (2005), also using the KwaZulu-Natal data, find that children who received the 
CSG for two-thirds of the period before their third birthday exhibited significantly higher height-
for-age scores; and Agüero, Carter and Woolard (2007) estimate the nutrition effects of the CSG 
and find that large doses of the grant in the early stages of childhood are associated with increased 
nutrition, measured by height for age. 
 
When examined through the lens of the asset-based framework developed in Section 2, the CSG 
literature, and to some extent the South African grants literature in general, primarily examines 
the effects of transfers on single assets, such as health human capital of children. However, as 
argued previously, despite the lack of recognition in the literature, assets differ in several 
dimensions and are closely interrelated, such that examining individual assets in isolation cannot 
provide a comprehensive picture of likely long term poverty dynamics.  
 
It is therefore important to consider not just the magnitude of asset holdings but also the 
composition in order to understand the likely impacts for sustainable poverty reduction. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
age measures of girl children living with a female SOAP recipient but no significant effect for boys or those living with a 
male pensioner. 
5
 For example, Case and Deaton (1998) find that pensioner households tend to spend pension income in much the 
same way as other income; Maitra and Ray (2003), on the other hand, find that public transfers crowd out private 














particular assets chosen will strongly affect the timescale in which returns can be expected and 
whether escape from poverty is likely for current or only future generations. It follows that, to gain 
a more complete picture of these longer term impacts, a broader examination of the potential 
asset effects is required. This will facilitate an analysis of the extent to which South Africa’s social 
grants system is performing a ‘promotional’ role as well as an insight into the ability of cash 















4. METHOD  
 
The preceding sections have focused primarily on the first of the twin objectives identified upfront, 
namely developing a conceptual framework within which to situate analyses of South Africa’s 
social grants. This section and the two which follow will deal with Objective 5, as set out in the 
Introduction, thereby shifting the focus to the second major goal: examining the likely longer term 
impacts of the grants system through an examination of the CSG. In light of the conceptual 
framework proposed, this analysis is critical for ascertaining the extent to which the CSG is indeed 
influencing asset-building among recipients and, thus, what effect it is likely to have on the 
underlying causes of poverty. Before presenting the results of the empirical work and considering 
their implications, the method applied will be comprehensively detailed in this section in order to 
outline why the chosen method was pursued and any important practical issues arising in the 
process.  
4.1 RATIONALE FOR EXAMINING EXPENDITURE PATTERNS  
 
Data limitations preclude longitudinal assessments of the effect of grant receipt on specific 
households making it difficult to reliably assess the effect of the CSG on asset stocks. However, it is 
possible to examine asset flows by considering expenditure patterns to determine whether 
recipient households are investing differently than non-recipients in asset-building. This approach 
fits well within a capabilities-based framework by focusing on active choices by CSG households, 
rather than examining side effects of grant receipt. Analysing current expenditure also allows a 
‘revealed preference’ comparison of the priorities of recipient households in relation to non-
recipient households.  
 
To examine whether CSG income is being channelled in such a way as to influence asset-building, 
this empirical analysis seeks to test the hypothesis that CSG recipient households exhibit 
significantly different spending patterns from comparable non-recipient households. It has been 
established that the grant provides much needed income support to vulnerable households but 
this analysis aims to establish whether this important component of anti-poverty policy in its 
current form is capable of making long term and sustainable reductions in poverty.   
 
A key insight of the conceptual framework developed in Section 2 is that monetary income is not 
important in itself but instrumentally so. Within this perspective, development is concerned with 














income is used, rather than how much is received per se. Examining expenditure patterns permits 
just such an assessment. The following analysis closely follows the method of Gao et al. (2010), 
who use a propensity score matching method to examine the expenditure impacts of a cash 
transfer in rural China. Gao et al. find that grant recipient households spend significantly more on 




This analysis uses the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)6, a national 
household panel study administered by the Southern African Labour and Development Research 
Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. The field work was carried out in 2008, with 7,305 
households surveyed across the country and each household member completing a separate 
questionnaire. NIDS examines income, expenditure and consumption patterns as well as a rich set 
of variables concerned with economic participation, wellbeing, human capital formation and 
vulnerability.  
 
In order to reduce the recall bias that can occur when attempting to elicit annual figures, the NIDS 
monetary data focus primarily on monthly values, with income focusing on ‘last month’ and 
expenditure on ‘the last thirty days’. This may however create some element of lumpiness due to 
sources of income that are not received on a monthly basis, such as inheritances or remittances. It 
is not clear whether this will have a significant effect on the results, although, given that this 
analysis focuses on a subset of the NIDS sample, namely recipients of the CSG and comparable 
control households, the relative importance of these income sources between the two groups can 
be examined to assess whether there are any significant differences7. 
 
Recognising that households derive economic benefit from living in dwellings that they do not pay 
rent for, the NIDS dataset contains implied rent figures for both income and expenditure; omitting 
this flow of welfare risks understating the effective income of those who own their own homes. 
However, as this analysis is concerned with actual monetary values of income that can be invested 
in assets, implied rental is stripped out of both income and expenditure. However, the value of a 
                                                      
 
6
 The NIDS data and all supporting documentation and questionnaires are available on the NIDS website at: 
http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/home/ 
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home that is owned does represent an investment in assets and so the significance of this is tested 
in the sensitivity analysis, which repeats the analysis incorporating implied rent.  
In some cases missing income and expenditure figures have been imputed in order to correct for 
item non-response for specific income and expenditure items. Details of how these imputations 
have been carried out can be found in Finn et al. (2009) and Argent (2009). These imputations are 
used in the analysis and, again, for sensitivity, the analysis is also run without any imputed values 
 
4.3 THE EVALUATION PROBLEM 
 
The main challenge in evaluating the impact of a programme such as the CSG that is universally 
available to all who qualify lies in constructing a suitable counterfactual. It is not appropriate to 
approximate the programme impact by simply comparing the mean outcome of participants and 
non-participants as these groups will tend to differ in a variety of ways, even in the absence of the 
programme (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008: 1). In order to account for this bias, propensity score 
matching can be used to approximate a randomised experiment, in which random programme 
assignment is the only difference between programme and control groups (Gibson, 2003: 447).  
 
In keeping with the notation used in the programme evaluation literature, households can occupy 
one of two mutually exclusive states, ‘treated’ or ‘control’, where treatment in this case refers to 
receipt of the CSG. Let the binary variable Ti represent the treatment status of household i, with 
Ti=1 if treatment is received and Ti=0 if treatment is not received. Let Yi(0) denote the outcome for 
household i under the control scenario and Yi(1) the outcome under treatment. The treatment 
effect for household i is therefore Yi(1) - Yi(0) and the average effect of treatment on the 
population is E[Yi(1) - Yi(0)]. However, the evaluation problem arises from the fact that we observe 
Yi = Ti.Yi(1) + (1-Ti).Yi(0) but we can never observe the pair (Yi(1), Yi(0)) as a household either 
receives the CSG or it does not. The unobserved outcome, or counterfactual, is not known and so 
individual treatment effects cannot be seen. One must therefore focus on population average 
treatment effects (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008: 1). 
 
A vector of pre-treatment variables, or covariates, can be observed and denoted Xi. We can then 
construct the propensity score, the conditional probability of receiving the treatment, as: 
 















Having calculated propensity scores, these can then be used to construct a weighted 
counterfactual from the non-treated sample. The kernel matching method allows the construction 
of kernel weights such that a weighted regression can then be run for each of the outcome 
variables on a constant, the treatment indicator and the vector of covariates, Xi. Estimates of the 
average treatment effect can thus be attained by comparing outcomes of the treated with a 
relevant subset of the untreated population. As we are interested in the asset effects of the grant 
for poor households, the regression is restricted to those households falling into the bottom three 
income quintiles8. In line with Gao et al. (2010), the robustness of the findings are tested by 
running OLS regressions following the method of Case and Deaton (1998) to examine whether CSG 
income is spent in the same way as other income. The expenditure outcomes are regressed on 
both pre-CSG and CSG income and the two coefficients compared to examine whether both 
income sources are treated in a similar way.  
 
4.4 KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
Two important assumptions lie beneath a reliable estimation of the average effect of receiving the 
CSG among CSG-recipient households. The first is variously referred to in the literature as the 
selection on observables, unconfoundedness or exogeneity assumption (Imbens, 2004). This states 
that, given Xi, treatment is random (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). This can 
be represented by: 
 
Yi(0), Yi(1) ⊥ Ti | Xi  where ⊥ denotes independence. 
 
In other words, conditional on the pre-treatment variables, the potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment assignment. This is clearly a strong assumption and effectively says that 
all important observable covariates are captured in the specification of the propensity score and, 
further, that no unobserved variables significantly affect both probability of treatment and 
outcome variables. The likelihood of this assumption being met depends on how informative the 
dataset is and whether it is sufficiently rich to account for selection into treatment. Fortunately, 
NIDS is extremely rich in demographic and socio-economic data.  
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Ideally, all variables included in the vector Xi would have been collected prior to the initiation of 
the treatment. Unfortunately, in the case of the CSG, this is not possible as the programme has 
already been in place for several years. However, the specification of the propensity score is 
carried out by carefully selecting variables that can reasonably be expected to be exogenous by 
focusing on enduring factors, such as household head’s socio-economic status. Moreover, given 
the intended analysis, care is taken to avoid the use of any ‘asset’ variables, such as ownership of 
consumer durables, in the specification as well as any expenditure variables as these form the 
outcome variables of interest. Therefore, even if the unconfoundedness assumption is not fully 
satisfied, it is likely to be a reasonable approximation, especially where such a rich dataset is 
available to provide extensive information about household characteristics.  
 
One important variable that could potentially violate the selection on observables assumption is 
that of the number of children in the household. If there is evidence that the existence of the CSG 
actually incentivises childbearing then matching on this variable may introduce bias. However, 
despite public perception to the contrary, it has been demonstrated (Makiwane & Udjo, 2006) that 
there is no link between the provision of the CSG and fertility. This is perhaps not surprising given 
the relatively low monetary value of the grant.  
  
The second assumption, referred to in the literature as common support, precludes perfect 
predictability of Ti given Xi (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008: 4). Formally, the common support 
assumption requires that: 
 
0 < Pr(Ti = 1 | Xi) < 1     
 
This enforces the condition that households with the same values of X have a positive probability 
of being both participants and controls (Lechner, 2002: 62). Common support can be further 
strengthened by removing any treatment observations with a propensity score that is higher than 
the maximum or lower than the minimum of the control group values. Appendix 1 demonstrates 
that the common support assumption is met, as the distribution of propensity scores for both 
groups overlap. 
 
4.5 MATCHING METHOD 
 
Using Stata’s PSMatch2 module (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003), the propensity of CSG receipt for each 














propensity of CSG receipt for household i in demographic group g using the following logistical 
regression model: 
 
Pr (Ti = 1 | ∑Xig, θg)  
where ∑Xig represents the sum of socio-demographic factors that may influence the likelihood of 
CSG participation. The vector Xig comprises the following observed socio-demographic variables: 
household head’s age, years of schooling, employment status, self-rated health condition, marital 
status and community participation; as well as household level monthly income per adult 
equivalent less CSG income, province, geo-type, the number of children aged 0-6, children aged 7-
14, youths aged 15-18, adults aged 18-39, adults aged 40-60 and pensioners in the household, and 
whether a household member has been seriously ill or injured in the last 24 months.  
 
A kernel matching method is chosen using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06 and 
common support is enforced. Unlike nearest neighbour matching, which matches treated 
households to control households with the closest match in terms of propensity score, regardless 
of how similar the scores are, kernel matching uses weighted averages of households in the control 
group to construct a suitable counterfactual. This has the advantage of using more information in 
the propensity score specification and thus a lower variance (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
The kernel weights are derived from a kernel function of the propensity score: 
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where K(.) represents the kernel function and b is the bandwidth (Branson et al., 2009). The 
bandwidth determines the subsample of non CSG recipients to be used in the counterfactual and 
the kernel function determines the importance of each household included for each CSG 
household. The NIDS survey weights are taken into account, with swj denoting these, and the 
weights are constructed to sum to one. 
 
4.5.1 Defining Treatment 
 
The unit of analysis in this study is the household as we are interested in expenditures, which 














a number of ways to define ‘treatment’. To illustrate, treatment could either be deemed to occur 
where a household contains a child for which CSG is received, or where a household contains an 
adult reporting CSG receipt. In the NIDS dataset, the relevant variables would be w1_c_grcurtyp in 
the child survey and w1_a_incchld in the adult survey respectively. In the majority of cases, these 
measures would identify the same households, but in the event that the caregiver receiving the 
grant is not actually co-resident with the relevant child or if data are missing in one or other of the 
questionnaires, the two methods would return different results9.  
 
Since we are interested in the potential effects of receiving CSG income on expenditure patterns, 
this study will focus on the grant rather than the child; that is, treatment is defined as households 
in which at least one adult receives the CSG on behalf of a child. A household is therefore classified 
as a CSG recipient if either (i) an adult reports receiving the CSG or (ii) CSG is reported for at least 
one child in the household and the person code of the recipient relates to a current household 
member. Any households reporting CSG in the child survey where the recipient is not resident are 
not regarded as recipient households.  
 
4.5.2 Matching within Strata 
 
Given the unconfoundedness assumption, it is important to consider any observables that may 
capture additional contextual factors as, if any important variables are not included, households 
can be mismatched and estimates of treatment effects may be biased. Background differences 
within population group, for example, might mean that matching a household of a given race with 
an otherwise similar household of a different race would miss these underlying factors. Similarly, 
there may be geographic factors which affect the decision to apply for, or access to, grant income. 
In order to account for this possibility, socio-economic strata were constructed and matching 
carried out within these. 
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 In 100 households, CSG was reported for at least one child and a current household member identified as receiving 
the grant income but the adult data did not correspond. In the adult questionnaire, the question on whether CSG is 
received was either recorded as no or missing. It was assumed that, when the adult variable was missing, these 
households do in fact receive the grant; but when the adult reported no CSG income, the adult response was given 
precedence on the grounds that the questionnaire was completed by the individual in question. In this latter case, 














Care must be taken to prevent strata sizes from becoming too small for matching to be possible. Of 
all the CSG-recipient households in the survey, 99.1% comprised African or Coloured members10. It 
was therefore decided to focus the analysis on these two groups and exclude the white and 
Indian/Asian households from the matching, as otherwise the sub-groups would be too small for 
within-group matching. Disaggregating households by province generated insufficient observations 
in several provinces so geo-type11 was selected as a more suitable variable to capture geographic 
variation; indeed barriers to access are perhaps more likely to be demarcated along urban-rural 
lines than province boundaries12. Population group, an urban/ non-urban indicator and gender of 
household head were thus used to construct the strata used. The total number of households in 
each of the defined strata is shown in Table 1. A total of 1,886 treated households and 1,422 
control households are included in the analysis13.  
 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH MATCHING STRATA  
 Population Group  
 African Coloured Total 
Geo-type Male Female Male Female  
Urban 452 677 207 179 1,515 
Non- Urban 616 1,067 75 35 1,793 
Total 2,812 496 3,308 
 
4.5.3 Definition of Income  
 
Following Gao et al. (2010), matching is based on pre-CSG household income per adult 
equivalent 14 . Treated households are thus matched to untreated households that are 
demographically similar but have lower actual incomes on account of not receiving the CSG.  
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 This figure is 98.1% when survey weights are applied. 
11
 Geo-types are decomposed into: Urban Formal; Urban Informal; Rural Formal and Tribal Authority Area. 
12
 Province dummy variables are still included in the vector Xi and in the subsequent regressions such that any province 
effects should still be adequately captured. 
13
 Households with missing values for any of the Xi variables cannot be reliably matched so are excluded from the 
analysis. 476 CSG households were eliminated due to missing values and are not included in these totals.  
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Monthly household income minus CSG income may underestimate pre-CSG income if displacement 
effects occur following receipt of the grant. Suppose, for example, a household had been receiving 
remittances from friends or relatives outside the household which are subsequently reduced or 
stopped when CSG income begins. In this case, the estimated value of pre-grant income will not 
include the displaced remittance income and could therefore match that household with a control 
household that is “too poor”. Given the relatively low value of the grant this is not expected to be a 
large effect however the magnitude can be estimated by looking at mean remittance income for 
the treated and control groups. It is found that average household monthly income from 
remittances is R151 for treated households and R142 for control households. Conducting t-tests for 
equality of means finds that these values are not significantly different. The CSG does not 
therefore appear to crowd out remittances hence no adjustments are necessary to address this 
effect.  
 
4.5.4 Balancing Tests 
 
After matching, the PSTest module (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003) is run to test the balancing of the 
variables in the vector Xi. For each covariate, t-tests for equality of means in the treated and 
untreated groups are conducted before and after matching. If any of the t-tests indicate the 
persistence of statistically significant differences between the groups at the 5% level, higher order 
or interaction terms of the unbalanced variables are used in the matching specification (Dehejia & 
Wahba, 2002: 161)15. To increase the robustness of the matching, ‘external’ balancing tests are 
also carried out on a range of variables that are not used in the propensity score specification.  
 
It should be noted that survey weights cannot be applied during the matching process with the 
PSMatch2 module. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the use of survey weights 
during propensity score matching (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003). Weights were not therefore applied 
during the matching specification or in the balancing tests performed by the module. However, by 
manually calculating the balance of control and treated groups it is possible to compare the results 
both with and without weighting.  
 
Having completed this process, the effects of CSG receipt on household expenditures are 
estimated as the regression-adjusted differences in expenditures between treated households and 
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 The additional terms used are: income squared, income cubed, age squared, urban informal x income, Northern 














untreated control households. Following Gao et al. (2010), the covariates used in the specification 
of the propensity score, the vector Xi , are included in the regression models. As the authors note, 
doing so can help eliminate any remaining differences between treated and control households 
thereby increasing the chance of detecting significant treatment effects (Gibson, 2003; Hill et al., 
2003). Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is conducted to estimate the effects of CSG on a 
range of outcome variables as follows: 
 
Oig = β0 + β1Tig + β2Xig + θg + ε      
 
where Oig represents the expenditure outcome of household i in matching strata g; Tig is the binary 
treatment variable; Xig is the vector of covariates as described in Section 3.3; θg denotes the within-
strata fixed effects; and ε is a random error term.   
 
4.5.5 Outcome Variables 
 
All outcome variables are constructed to examine monthly household expenditure per adult 
equivalent. As well as examining total expenditure, more detailed spending patterns are 
considered by decomposing this into twelve major spending categories: food; housing; clothing; 
health; education; utilities; transport; insurance; household goods; leisure; alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling; and miscellaneous purchases16. 
 
Clearly some of these expenditure categories could be more appropriately interpreted as asset-
building expenditure than others. Spending on education, for example, would be expected to 
increase human capital assets; and household goods expenditure could increase the physical assets 
held. Conversely, spending on alcohol, tobacco and gambling could be seen as detrimental to 
asset-building, such that only a significant and negative coefficient on this expenditure category 
could indicate additional asset-building expenditure. Nevertheless, the analysis includes all 
expenditure categories in order to provide a more complete assessment of household expenditure 
patterns. Where significant results are found, the implications of the coefficient, and its sign, for 
the expenditure in question will be explored.  
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 Miscellaneous purchases comprise: cleaning agents, childcare, membership dues, domestic labour, swimming pool 














5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Following on from the preceding methodological discussion, this section will present the results of 
the analysis described and discuss their implications in terms of the conceptual framework 
established in the first part of this study. Unless otherwise specified, the discussion that follows 
relates to the baseline matching and regression specification, which strips out implied rent, 
includes imputed income and expenditure values, matches within race, geo-type and gender of 
household head, and restricts the regressions to households falling into the bottom three income 
quintiles prior to receipt of the CSG17. All estimates presented apply the post-stratified sampling 
weights provided18 in order to make the results reflective of the South African population, rather 
than the NIDS sample. 
 
Appendix 2 shows the balance tests on the mean values of household demographic variables of 
treated and non-treated households before and after matching. Mean values for non-recipient 
households before matching are shown in column 1, recipient households in column 2 and non-
participants after matching in column 3. It is clear that before matching the CSG recipient 
households exhibit many significant differences from their non-recipient counterparts. Prior to 
matching, recipient households had significantly lower incomes, contained on average more than 
two additional members and were more likely to contain a household member who had 
experienced serious illness or injury in last 24 months. Moreover, compared to non-recipient 
households, recipient household heads were older, more likely to be female, had two years fewer 
schooling and were more likely to be unemployment or not economically active.  
 
The balance tests conducted with survey weights are also presented in Appendix 2. This version 
also demonstrates strong balance, with only one variable, namely the dummy variable for 
household head’s rating their health status as ‘good’, remaining significant after matching.  
 
To further test the robustness of the balancing, quintiles of the propensity score are constructed 
and the balance tests rerun for each quintile. This technique highlights whether balance is broadly 
achieved throughout the full distribution of propensity scores or whether a subset of the control 
households is driving the overall balance. For brevity, this analysis is not presented, however it 
shows that for the bottom three quintiles there are no significant differences between treated and 
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 The results from alternative specifications are presented in the sensitivity analysis in Appendix 6. 
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control households. A number of significant differences do however emerge among the higher 
propensity score groups, namely the proportion of households living in the Northern Cape and the 
number of pensioners in the fourth quintile; and in the fifth quintile, the number of households 
containing a member that has been seriously ill or injured in the past 24 months, household heads 
that are non-economically active, those that are divorced or separated and households living in the 
Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. However, on the whole, the balance 
appears to remain fairly strong across the whole sample of treated and control households. For 
sensitivity, the analysis is rerun using only those quintiles of propensity score for which no 
significant differences are found. 
 
The balance tests suggest that the assumption of selection on observables is indeed met, as any 
significant differences between the treated and untreated groups are eliminated when the latter is 
restricted to the weighted control group. An analysis of propensity score quintiles also 
demonstrates strong balance, especially among the groups with lower propensity scores. The 
propensity score matching method therefore appears to allow the construction of a comparable 
weighted control group based on the covariates included in the specification.   
 
5.1 POVERTY IMPLICATIONS 
  
Before investigating the estimated effects of CSG on household expenditures, it is worth briefly 
examining the impact of household CSG receipt on some basic income poverty measures. The 
stated purpose of the grant is, after all, to provide income security to vulnerable groups and so the 
income implications are worth bearing in mind throughout the following analysis. Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) measures of poverty are presented in Table 2 for the treated and control groups 
based on income before and after CSG transfer. Following Leibbrandt et al (2010), upper and lower 
income poverty lines of R515 and R949 per adult equivalent are applied19.  
 
FGT measures are defined by: 
 




              
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where n is the total number of households; q is the number of households falling below the 
poverty line; z is the rand value of the poverty line; yi is the income of the ith household; and α can 
be viewed as a measure of poverty aversion. When α=0, P0 simply returns the poverty headcount 
ratio, q/n. However, this measure does not capture the extent to which household incomes fall 
below the poverty line. The poverty gap index, α=1, gives the sum of the income shortfall of poor 
households as a proportion of the poverty line normalised by total population size. The poverty 
gap measure can capture income dynamics among subsets of the poor, which would be missed by 
the headcount ratio. For even greater emphasis on the depth of poverty, the squared poverty gap, 
α=2 can be used (Foster et al., 1984). 
 
TABLE 2: FGT POVERTY MEASURE ESTIMATES FOR TREATED AND CONTROL HOUSEHOLDS 
POVERTY MEASURE  HEADCOUNT POVERTY GAP SQUARED POVERTY GAP 
α= 0 1 2 
Lower poverty line of R515 per adult equivalent per month 
Control Households 0.68 0.39 0.28 
Treated Households Before CSG Income 0.65 0.39 0.30 
Treated Households With CSG Income  0.56 0.25 0.15 
Upper poverty line of R949 per adult equivalent per month 
Control Households 0.89 0.59 0.44 
Treated Households Before CSG Income 0.86 0.57 0.44 
Treated Households With CSG Income  0.82 0.47 0.31 
 
Looking first at the poverty headcount measure, it can be seen that without the CSG the treated 
households exhibit similar levels of income poverty to the control households, with 65% of 
households in this group falling below the lower poverty line compared to 68% of the control 
households. After the cash transfer, however, this falls to only 56% for treated households. The 
poverty gap measure (α=1) shows an even more dramatic reduction, from 39% to 25%. This 
measure captures changes within the subset of poor households and shows that households 
receiving the CSG have monthly incomes that are, on average, closer to the poverty line than 
untreated households. This is not surprising given that the control group have been selected as 
households with income levels similar to the pre-transfer levels of treated households. 
Nevertheless, it is worth keeping this income effect in mind throughout the subsequent analysis.  
 
5.2 EXPENDITURE EFFECTS 
 
The estimates of β1, the effect of CSG receipt on monthly household expenditures per adult 
equivalent, and robust standard errors are presented in Table 3, with each cell containing the 














coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated rand value of the change in monthly household 
expenditure attributable to CSG receipt. For comparison, coefficients are also presented from a 
naïve OLS regression on the whole sample20. The sample size for each regression is displayed in the 
bottom row.   
 
TABLE 3: EFFECTS OF CSG RECEIPT ON EXPENDITURES PER ADULT EQUIVALENT (R/ MONTH)  
 Naïve model Propensity Score Reweighted Model 
 Coefficient  Robust 
Standard Error 
Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error 
Total Expenditure  -234.4 (58.53)*** -52.22 (33.98) 
     
Food -33.11 (10.14)**  4.03 (8.00) 
Housing -35.32 (7.00)*** -9.37 (3.40)**  
Clothing -4.67 (2.29)*   -2.93 (5.08) 
Health -4.66 (1.55)**  -4.64 (2.14)*   
Education -32.71 (12.08)**  -0.82 (10.08) 
Utilities -9.88 (3.07)**  -3.61 (4.81) 
Transport -9.36 (4.07)*   1.98 (4.74) 
Insurance -4.15 (1.29)**  -2.37 (1.83) 
Household items -1.82 (2.91) 1.64 (6.86) 
Leisure -11.94 (3.80)**  -33.39 (22.68) 
Alcohol, tobacco and gambling -8.87 (2.78)**  -2.08 (1.20) 
Miscellaneous -3.61 (1.25)**  -1.02 (1.99) 
     
N = 3,352  2,41021  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The naïve model finds negative and significant coefficients on every expenditure category except 
household items. This model shows that, when comparing to all low-income non-recipient 
households, CSG households can clearly not be argued to invest disproportionately more in asset-
building.  
 
However, when propensity score matching is used to identify a comparable weighted control 
group, most of these significant differences disappear and the spending patterns of the two groups 
become extremely similar. The propensity score reweighted model returns only two significant 
coefficients, housing costs and health.  
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 Also excluding the top two income quintiles. 
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 Note that this figure is not the same as the total number of treated and control households in Table 1 as it excludes 














5.2.1 Subgroup Expenditure Categories 
 
An assessment of the twelve major spending categories provides little evidence of CSG households 
exhibiting significant differences in household spending patterns compared to the control group. It 
may be useful to decompose some of these spending categories to examine whether any 
differences can be detected. The NIDS dataset allows further disaggregation of the spending 
categories such that, for those with sufficient observations, it is possible to re-run the analysis on 
subsets of the major spending categories identified. With regard to asset-building, the main 
categories of interest for this analysis are food, health and education.  
 
Food expenditure is interesting as, without spending significantly more on average, treated 
households could still be shifting consumption towards more nourishing items, thereby improving 
the nutrition of household members, especially children. Health is worth probing more deeply to 
establish whether separating into curative and preventative care sheds any light on the significant 
difference detected, as a negative coefficient on health spending is somewhat ambiguous in terms 
of asset-building22. If treated households are spending less on curative healthcare, this could 
provide some support for the view that they experience better health, on average, and therefore 
do not need to spend as much on health. Finally education expenditure is pertinent as CSG 
recipients are exempt from paying school fees (Education and Training Unit, n.d. para. 2). It follows 
that, if removing this category from education expenditure reveals a positive coefficient, it may yet 
be possible to conclude that treated households are investing more in the education human capital 
of their children.  
 
The results of the subgroup expenditure analysis are presented in Appendix 3. It is found that 
when food expenditure is separated into eight spending categories, no significant differences are 
found between treated and control households. With regard to health spending, while the 
coefficients on curative and preventative health are indeed negative and positive respectively, 
neither is found to be significant. Nor does removing school fees from education expenditure and 
rerunning the OLS regression on school materials find any significant difference between the two 
groups. It is, however, important to note that treated households do still report expenditure on 
school fees, albeit at a lower level than control households. This may indicate a lack of awareness 
regarding the fee exemption for CSG beneficiaries.  
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The only significant coefficients in the baseline model are found on housing expenditure and 
health. The ambiguity of a negative coefficient on health has been discussed, however the negative 
coefficient on housing requires closer examination as the majority of households in the NIDS 
sample report home ownership and most do not pay housing costs. For home owners yet to pay 
off their property, a higher bond payment could either mean the dwelling has a higher market 
value or that the bond holder is nearer the beginning of repayment, thus further from full 
ownership of the asset.  
 
An examination of the data reveals that, for those households in the bottom three income 
quintiles, the mean market value of treated and control group properties is broadly similar, at 
R29,700 for treated households and R26,500 for control households. A robust examination of the 
outstanding bond value is not possible as only seven households in each group report non-missing 
values for this variable. However, it is found that the dwellings of treated households are more 
likely to be owned by a household member, with 87% reporting home ownership, compared to 
only 82% of control households. This difference is statistically significant. The negative coefficient 
on housing costs could thus be due to higher likelihood of ownership among treated households 
and thus lower current housing costs, thereby implying higher investment in housing assets.  
 
This can be tested by including implied rental values for those that do not pay housing costs in 
order to capture the welfare effects of living in an owned property. If the negative coefficient on 
housing in the baseline model is due primarily to greater incidence of home ownership among 
treated households, one would expect this significant effect to disappear when implied rental 
value is included in place of zeros for housing costs among owners. However, it is found that when 
implied rentals are included for those that do not pay housing costs, the coefficient remains 
negative and significant. It cannot therefore be concluded that treated households are investing 
more in housing assets than the control group.   
 
The lack of significant coefficients in the reweighted regressions is an interesting result. By 
matching treated households to control households based on pre-CSG income, the treated 
households, by construction, have a significantly higher income than non-treated households, yet 
they do not spend significantly more; either overall or on any specific expenditure category. This 
could provide some tentative support for the view that treated households are using some of their 















This is supported by the application of the Case and Deaton method, presented in Appendix 4. This 
analysis  shows that CSG income is treated broadly as other income in terms of most expenditure 
categories, although a weakly significant result is found with regard to education. It shows that, on 
average, 17 cents per Rand of CSG income are directed towards education, compared to only 2 
cents per Rand of non-CSG income. This result is significant only at the 10 per cent level and it is 
not supported by the propensity score matching method, however it may provide some grounds 
for investigating education expenditure more closely in the future.  
 
The remittance behaviour of both groups can be examined to determine whether any significant 
differences emerge in the sending of remittances. The OLS regressions described above were rerun 
using remittances in cash and in kind respectively as the dependent variables. However in neither 
case was the coefficient on the treatment indicator found to be significant. 
 
Some insight into why households, on average, do not spend all of the additional grant income 
could be provided by the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), originally advocated by Milton 
Friedman. The hypothesis states that consumption decisions are based not on current income but 
on longer term income expectations, such that income changes regarded as temporary have little 
bearing on consumption decisions (Eisner, 1958). If the CSG is not regarded as permanent, this 
hypothesis may partly explain why treated households do not exhibit significantly different 
spending patterns than control households. Of course, the CSG is, by design, a temporary source of 
income support, although the current maximum of fifteen years represents a fairly considerable 
time period23.  
 
If the PIH is an appropriate representation for the consumption decisions of CSG households then 
this implies that a sizable proportion of the grant income may be being saved in some way. It is 
useful therefore to consider the financial assets of the treated and control groups to examine 
whether the former is more likely to contain members that, for example, hold bank accounts. The 
NIDS data permit an analysis of the financial instruments held by the two groups of households. 
The findings are presented in Appendix 5 and illustrate considerable similarities between the two 
groups. What is perhaps most striking about this financial analysis, however, is the overall lack of 
ownership of formal financial instruments among both treated and control households. Treated 
households are more likely to hold bank accounts, although fewer than half of these households 
contain even one member that holds a bank account. It seems likely, then, that if the treated 
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households are indeed saving part of their additional monthly income from the CSG, they are not 
necessarily doing so within the formal financial system and so they may not be doing so in the 
most efficient way. 
 
Another issue worth considering is the effect of other social grants on expenditure patterns. 
Although the control group do not receive the CSG, it is possible that they are receiving other 
government transfers, such as the SOAP, and this may be pushing their expenditure patterns in line 
with those of CSG households, thereby masking the impact of the CSG. To investigate the potential 
magnitude of this effect, the regressions are re-run excluding those control households that 
receive another social grant. For brevity the results are not presented but it is found that the only 
significant coefficient is on housing costs.  
 
In summary, the preceding analysis does not find the same human capital effects as Gao et al. 
(2010) find in China; there is little evidence of investment in household assets and treated 
households do not appear more likely to hold formal financial assets. Given the higher income of 
treated households, the absence of a significant and positive coefficient on total expenditure may 
provide some tentative evidence of higher savings, although it is not possible to draw any firm 
conclusions in this direction.  
 
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND LIMITATIONS OF METHOD 
 
The method set out above was repeated several times under the following alternative 
specifications: 
 
1. Matching within strata defined by the four geo-type variables only; 
2. All income and expenditure variables use per capita terms instead of adult equivalents; 
3. Household equivalence measures use OECD equivalence scales24;  
4. Implied rents are included in income and expenditure; 
5. Imputed income and expenditure figures are excluded from analysis; 
6. Top two quintiles of propensity score are excluded from the analysis. 
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The coefficients and standard errors generated by each of these specifications are presented in 
Appendix 6. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the results are robust to a range of adjustments as 
all specifications return housing expenditure as significantly negative and three of the six 
specifications also finding the coefficient on health significantly negative. When imputed income 
and expenditure figures are excluded total expenditure also becomes significant and negative.  
 
Taking the results of the base case and the various specifications considered in the sensitivity 
analysis, the key result is very clear. This method does not provide sufficient grounds to conclude 
that treated households exhibit significantly different spending patterns from comparable non-
recipient households.   
 
While the propensity score matching method attempts to estimate the causal impact of receiving 
treatment, it cannot completely remove all selection bias issues. Specifically, if the 
unconfoundedness assumption is not met, the results are likely to overestimate the effects of 
treatment. However, as this analysis has not in fact found treatment to be associated with large 
effects on the outcome variables considered, the possibility of having overestimated these effects 
is less of a problem. Moreover, a thorough sensitivity analysis tests the robustness of the model to 
changes in a range of underlying variables and finds the broad result, namely that treated 
households do not exhibit significantly different expenditure patterns from non-treated 
households, remains unchanged.  
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the method chosen examines average effects between two 
groups of households and cannot therefore identify sub-patterns in expenditure within these 
groups. For example, it is possible that within the group of treated households there are subgroups 
of households that respond to the grant in different ways. Nevertheless, this study will provide a 
useful first step in establishing a broad picture of expenditure behaviour and identifying any 
















6. IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET-BUILDING 
 
The foregoing empirical discussion indicates that, based on an examination of expenditure 
patterns, CSG-recipient households do not invest disproportionately more in asset-building than 
comparable non-recipient households. The analysis shows that treated households do not spend 
more on education or health human capital, nor are they significantly more likely than control 
households to send remittances, a potential indicator of investment in social capital. Of course, 
lack of statistical significance does not equate to practical irrelevance; just because differences in 
expenditure patterns are not statistically significant does not mean that the CSG is not having a 
‘significant’ effect on the lives of the recipients. The discussion in Section 3.2 demonstrated that 
the CSG is generating a range of positive socio-economic effects. The outcome of the preceding 
analysis simply indicates that receipt of the CSG in itself does not appear to generate significant 
changes in spending behaviour. This section will build on this key finding by setting out the case for 
seeking a stronger asset effect from the CSG. The rationale behind a linking approach will be 
discussed in order to contextualise the subsequent section.  
 
The empirical findings presented by no means represent a failure of the grant and, indeed, given 
the government’s focus on income poverty, the CSG is undoubtedly contributing to income 
security. However, within the conceptual framework established, the grant does not appear to be 
boosting the asset holdings of treated households in a way that is different from other income 
flowing into low income households. This may not be altogether surprising when considering the 
literature on asset thresholds; in the presence of an asset poverty trap, an increase in monetary 
income alone will be insufficient to allow escape from poverty unless it can raise asset levels above 
the threshold. If the grant value is not sufficient to achieve this, the underlying structural barriers 
to escaping poverty are likely to dominate.  
 
Despite arguing in Section 2.2 that social protection measures have the potential to reduce chronic 
poverty by facilitating increased asset holdings, the empirical analysis shows that, in the case of the 
CSG, unconditional cash transfers do not automatically change the expenditure patterns of 
recipients and thus cannot in themselves be said to boost asset-building. If recipient households 
are, on average, treating grant income in the same way as other sources of income, this may 
simply reflect the grants’ ability to provide much-needed income support as intended: the extra 
income is subsumed within the household budget and spending decisions are based on overall 
pooled income rather than ring-fencing certain income sources for particular expenditures. This 
would imply that the phenomenon of mental accounting, whereby households divide their income 














fully fungible. At the household level, this undoubtedly represents efficient and rational behaviour, 
all other things being equal25.  
 
The CSG provides income support to vulnerable households to alleviate the symptoms of poverty 
but it does not ensure the conversion of that additional income into assets; neither does the 
preceding empirical analysis find support for the view that this is happening indirectly. However, 
the conceptual framework developed in Section 2 demonstrates that, in the absence of increased 
asset-building, longer term poverty reduction is unlikely to be achieved as the underlying causes of 
poverty will persist.  
 
So, if the CSG has been demonstrated to reduce income poverty and recipients are responding 
efficiently to the cash transfer yet long-term investment in assets does ot appear to be taking 
place, does this mean that influencing the underlying causes of poverty is ultimately beyond the 
power of the CSG? I will argue that the answer is no: there may be scope for a child-targeted cash 
transfer to generate longer term poverty reduction effects by combining the protective cash 
transfer element with more explicitly promotional measures. The next chapter attempts to bring to 
light relevant lessons from international experience in linking protection and promotion as a first 
step in thinking about how this could be achieved in South Africa; however, before turning to this, 
it is useful first to firmly establish the rationale or pursuing such a course to determine whether it 
is indeed socially desirable. 
 
6.1 RATIONALE FOR LINKING PROTECTION WITH PROMOTION 
 
This paper presents assets as the primary means of development and posits that households 
experiencing poverty are those holding insufficient or vulnerable asset stocks. It follows that a key 
objective of a developmental society, and by extension the democratic state, is enhancing asset 
holdings. Any justification for intervention thus hinges on the ability to achieve this in the most 
efficient way. Although CSG-recipient households appear to be responding efficiently to the 
additional grant income, as neoclassical economic theory demonstrates, privately optimal 
behaviour may not always lead to socially optimal outcomes. In the presence of market failures, 
there may be grounds for incentivising certain private behaviours in order to increase overall 
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societal welfare. In light of this, I will argue that the grounds for linking the cash transfer element 
of the CSG with promotional measures to incentivise asset-building are threefold and relate to (i) 
asset poverty traps; (ii) the merit good aspect of assets; and (iii) the productivity impacts of linking. 
 
As illustrated by Figure 2, conversion of income into capabilities depends on both a household’s 
ability to convert money into asset stocks through asset-building expenditure and the returns that 
can subsequently be generated from those assets. The propensity to invest in assets will thus be 
driven by expectations of both factors. If market failures, as opposed to personal choice, limit the 
ability of poor households to accumulate assets or to generate returns from an existing asset stock, 
then there may be grounds for attempting to correct those failures.  
 
Carter and Barrett (2006) argue that in the presence of locally increasing returns, there will be a 
positive relationship between a household’s existing level of assets and the marginal return they 
can gain from them. The authors provide three reasons why this positive relationship could occur 
and outline how this situation is likely to manifest itself in the form of asset poverty traps. The 
discussion in Section 3.1 established support for the view that poverty traps exist in South Africa, 
indicating that market failures are indeed at work. A systematic review of the potential market 
failures leading to poverty traps in South Africa is beyond the scope of this paper but some 
possibilities include: credit constraints; imperfect information about investment options; and 
labour market failures preventing access to wage employment. If poor households are prevented 
from investing in their desired asset level by structural poverty traps, there will be grounds to 
intervene to undermine these barriers. 
 
A second rationale for attempting to channel expenditure towards asset-building lies in the fact 
that there may be positive externalities in the accumulation of assets which cause the social 
benefits of doing so to exceed the private benefits. Poverty has been found to contribute to a 
number of social problems that affect the poor and non-poor alike, such as crime and diminished 
‘social capital’. The assets literature, especially the work of Michael Sherraden emphasises the 
importance of ‘asset effects’ over and above the monetary value of the assets held. Assets yield a 
range of behavioural benefits, such as creating an orientation toward the future and encouraging 
human capital, that income alone cannot guarantee. As Sherraden argues, “income only maintains 
consumption but assets change the way people think and interact in the world”, (Sherraden, 1991: 
6). Reducing poverty, herein conceptualised as a lack of assets, therefore confers benefits not only 















When the social benefits of a good or service exceed the private benefits such that individual 
consumers systematically under-invest in it, the good can be considered a ‘merit good’. Unlike a 
pure public good, merit goods are excludable and will be provided by the market to some but the 
social benefit in ensuring access for all is considered to be sufficiently large to warrant public 
provision. The merit good argument is often used to justify state provision of healthcare and 
primary education and supports the idea of encouraging recipients of cash transfers to invest in 
asset-building.  
 
The objectives of conventional promotional measures are generally centred on enhancing the 
productivity of recipients; an aim that can be readily justified on economic grounds. Moreover, I 
would argue that the CSG, by identifying low-income households containing children, offers an 
ideal opportunity to target promotional measures towards the next ge eration by encouraging 
investment in assets intended for the children themselves or the productive assets of working age 
caregivers. The CSG is considerably more likely to be paid to household members with ‘productive 
capacity’ than other grants. Recipients of the disability grant and social pension, for example, are,  
on the whole, outside of the labour force. The substantial literature on the enduring effects of child 
poverty provides convincing grounds to seek to mitigate and offset the effects of poverty on young 
people (Duncan et al., 1998; Heckman & Masterov, 2007). While providing income support to 
families with children goes some way toward achieving this, combining this support with 
promotional measures to encourage investment in assets will increase the likelihood of these 
effects enduring once the child is no longer eligible for the cash transfer. 
 
Having established the rationale for linking protection and promotion, it is perhaps surprising that 
the literature on linking relief from chronic poverty, which could reasonably be characterised as a 
‘permanent emergency’ (Duffield, 1994), with developmental objectives is limited. As discussed by 
Matin and Hulme (2003: 647), the protection versus promotion debate has increasingly given way 
to recognition of the need to combine both elements for effective poverty reduction. However, 
while the interrelationship between protection and promotion is increasingly acknowledged in the 
theoretical literature, the practical application of combined social protection measures is 
somewhat lagging behind.  
 
During the 1990s the literature on linking relief with development focused on the need for 
interventions in crisis situations to pursue developmental goals for more sustainable impacts. 
Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994) summarise this literature and argue that interventions in 














promotion. This literature does not however appear to have infiltrated the social protection 
agenda. 
 
Nevertheless, individual programmes and interventions pursuing this linking approach are 
increasing and evaluations suggest that these are proving relatively successful in addressing the 
longer term poverty situation by facilitating ‘graduation’ out of poverty. It is thus useful to conduct 
a brief review of selected experiences with such programmes to attempt to draw out any lessons 
that may inform the implementation of a more explicitly promotional element to the CSG. This 

















7. LESSONS FROM THREE CASE STUDIES: ENHANCING THE LINK 
BETWEEN CSG RECEIPT AND ASSET-BUILDING 
 
The following section addresses Objective 6, the final specific objective detailed in Section 1. When 
viewed through the lens of the conceptual framework established in Section 2, the findings of the 
empirical analysis of Section 5 demonstrate that the CSG as it stands cannot be argued to stimulate 
asset-building among recipient household. Rather than concluding the study at this point, it is 
useful to take these findings one step further by reflecting on some potential policy adjustments 
that could improve the poverty-reducing credentials of the grant. With this in mind, this section 
will briefly examine three programmes following a linking approach with a view to drawing out any 
lessons that could inform the development of complementary measures to improve the longer-
term poverty impact of the CSG.  
 
7.1 OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES 
 
The first two case studies focus on linking basic protective measures, cash transfers, with a 
specified range of productivity-enhancing measures. While these provide strong support for the 
idea of combining social protection mechanisms for sustained impact, an important type of asset 
that should not be overlooked is the accumulation of financial assets through savings and this is 
addressed in the third case study. As the empirical analysis in Section 5 highlights, there may be 
some tentative evidence that CSG recipient households are holding back some of their grant 
income from current consumption although they do not appear to be much more likely to use 
formal financial systems. Participant households might wish to save a small proportion of current 
grant income for their children’s future education or, if they already engage in income-generating 
activities, they may wish to save some of the proceeds.  
 
7.1.1 Ethiopia: Productive Safety Net Programme 
 
For decades, the threat of starvation has been a central feature of the lives of Ethiopia’s poor, 
especially the rural majority, dependent on rainfed agriculture (Gilligan et al., 2009: 1684). Since 
the 1980s, the government’s response has been frequent but ad hoc emergency appeals for food 
aid and disaster assistance. This strategy prevented mass starvation but was unable to diminish the 














programme (Gilligan et al., 2009). It was therefore recognised that a more integrated and proactive 
approach was required and, beginning in 2005, the government, supported by a number of 
international donors, implemented the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in a bid to 
address the root causes of food insecurity, rather than simply reacting to the symptoms each year.  
 
The PSNP was designed to provide transfers to the most food insecure households of the worst-
affected regions by combining a safety net element with the Other Food Security Programme 
(OFSP) in order to facilitate ‘graduation’ from food insecurity. The safety net comprised a public 
works programme, paying participants a daily wage for work on community asset-building projects 
or direct support of cash or food transfers for those households unable to provide labour, due to 
age or illness. The OFSP is a collective term for various productivity-enhancing services, including 
technological advice, access to credit and irrigation schemes (Gilligan et al., 2009: 1685).  
 
The OFSP is intended to complement the protective function of the safety net by facilitating 
income generation to build assets, although it has more limited coverage with not all PSNP 
beneficiaries enjoying access to the OFSP measures. The decision was taken early in the PSNP 
implementation to explicitly target the OFSP measures at PSNP beneficiaries for maximum impact. 
Over seven million beneficiaries have been reached by the PSNP and the annual budget runs to 
around US$500 million (Gilligan et al., 2009).  
 
Gilligan et al. (2009) use a propensity score matching technique to assess the effect of participation 
in the PSNP on various household outcomes, including consumption patterns, business activity and 
production and investment activity. Using three different measures of participation, the authors 
find that access to the safety net element alone does not bring about significant impacts. A second 
definition of participation involves receiving at least half of the transfers that should be received 
according to the design of the programme. By this measure, programme participation is found to 
improve two indicators of household food security. However, it is when participation is determined 
by access to both the safety net and OFSP components of the programme that the largest impacts 
are found. In this case, treated households are “more likely to be food secure, and are more likely 
to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, and operate non-farm 
own business activities” (Gilligan et al., 2009: 1703). Andersson et al. (2010) also find that the 
programme leads to increased forestry activity and the combined OFSP aspect generates increases 
















7.1.2 Bangladesh: Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development 
 
Bangladesh has embraced the use of microfinance as a route out of deprivation and this approach 
has indeed helped to reduce the extent of poverty in the country (Khandker, 2005). However, for 
those trapped in chronic poverty and holding little or no assets with which to mitigate the effects 
of their vulnerability, microfinance is unlikely to be effective, and taking on debt may even be 
detrimental (Matin & Hulme, 2003: 653). Food transfers have traditionally been the primary 
method of assistance for chronically poor households in Bangladesh; however, these alone do not 
address the underlying causes of long term poverty. The Income Generation for Vulnerable Group 
Development (IGVGD) programme sees poverty reduction as a two stage linear process that 
requires ‘two steps up’: protective measures create greater income and food security, which can 
then be built upon by promotional measures for income generation and asset-building (Matin & 
Hulme, 2003). 
 
Despite the many successful poverty reduction programmes in operation in Bangladesh, it is 
generally understood that most fail to reach the chronic poor (Matin & Hulme, 2003). The IGVGD 
programme, which specifically targets poor women, therefore seeks to expand the reach of anti-
poverty measures beyond the ‘moderate poor’ to incorporate the ‘hardcore poor’ and provide a 
viable route out of poverty for the very poorest households. Jointly led by the national 
government, the World Food Programme and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC), the world’s largest NGO, the IGVGD programme began as a pilot in 1985 but has since 
expanded to become a national programme targeting very poor women (Hashemi, 1996).  
 
IGVGD participants continue to receive food relief but, once selected for IGVGD, they can also 
choose from a range of skills training options, such as livestock raising, vegetable gardening or 
training in the hospitality industry (Hashemi, 1996). When training is complete, usually after six 
months, participants receive the first of two small loans, begin attending weekly meetings and 
making small savings each month. Participants are strongly encouraged to continue membership of 
BRAC with its regular microfinance programme but those that do not ‘graduate’ can repeat the 
IGVGD cycle and continue to receive food aid.  
 
In recent years, the programme has been reaching around 500,000 women in each programme 
cycle of 18 months (Hossain, 2008). Programme evaluations have found that the incomes of IGVGD 
participants rose significantly, material assets increased and participation in microfinance schemes 















An important facet of the IGVGD programme is undoubtedly the apparent willingness to constantly 
monitor outcomes and implementation and adapt the programme in line with findings. Experience 
from IGVGD, itself modified frequently, generated a wealth of knowledge that has been 
subsequently applied to its successor, the Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR) 
programme.  
 
7.1.3 Uganda: The Suubi Project 
 
Like many sub-Saharan African countries, Uganda is home to a large and growing proportion of 
orphans26, largely on account of a twenty year civil war and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
(Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009). As the number of orphans grows, the extended families that 
traditionally care for them are increasingly stretched, leading to greater incidence of family 
breakdown (Curley et al., 2009). Without the support of kin, children are forced to drop out of 
school to support themselves or younger siblings, foregoing education: a vital foundation for a 
productive future. Following implementation of its Poverty Eradication Action Plan in 1997, the 
government of Uganda committed to providing free primary education for the first seven years of 
schooling. Primary enrolment subsequently increased substantially, including among orphans 
(Curley et al., 2009: 2). However as secondary schooling was excluded from universal state 
provision, rates of post-primary education remain low, especially among orphans, limiting the 
employment prospects of poor children.  
 
The Suubi project recognises the importance of keeping vulnerable young people within their 
communities and provides a three-stage intervention aiming to increase asset holding among AIDS 
orphans and their caregivers to reduce the pressures leading to family breakdown. A total of 286 
youths aged 11-17 were randomly selected to participate, with around half receiving the 
intervention and the rest assigned to a control group (Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009: 5). The 
project consists of asset-building and career workshops; mentoring sessions; and a matched child 
development account (CDA) (Curley et al., 2009: 3). Over a ten-month period, participants attend 
twelve workshops covering topics such as career planning, financial skills and small business 
development as well as receiving monthly mentorship sessions. A CDA is opened in the child’s 
name but access is not permitted until after completion of all workshops. Friends and family of the 
child are encouraged to make deposits into the account and each dollar deposited is matched with 
an additional two dollars (ibid.). The Suubi project is thus an example of a promotion-dependent 
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grant as the CDA is opened only when the child participates in the other aspects of the 
programme.  
 
Rather than a simple cash transfer, the project incorporates a promotional element in order to 
enhance participants’ optimism about their future. Suubi provides a tangible financial asset that, 
when combined with the supplementary training, orphaned children can use to broaden their 
future choices (Curley et al., 2009). The multidimensional intervention provides orphans and their 
families with the confidence to plan for a productive future. This knowledge is thought to increase 
the motivation of the children to work hard and stay in school rather than dropping out due to 
feelings of hopelessness. Compared to the control group, participants performed better in primary 
school leaving exams; over the ten month period, they were significantly more likely to have 
positive changes in their education plans and to be more confident of achieving those plans (Curley 
et al., 2009: 5). Although this is a small study in one region of Uganda, the results provide some 
initial indication that poor households are able and willing to save modest amounts for the future 
of vulnerable youths in their care.  
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDIES 
 
Table 4 provides a summary of this basic case study review, highlighting the main strengths and 
weaknesses, as well as the rationale for choosing a linking approach.  
 
Despite an unfortunate lack of linking projects internationally, all of the projects examined have 
been found to lead to important and sustainable reductions in poverty through an asset-building 
approach. A possible source of bias in this analysis should however be noted upfront as, if there 
are linking projects that have not been successful, they are less likely to be examined in the 
literature. However, the case studies selected pursue a range of approaches and broad lessons can 
be drawn for initial reflection.  
 
Based on the examples studied, it appears that combining measures can generate longer term 
poverty reduction when stand alone measures have proven unable to do so. Each of the linking 
examples studied was initiated after policymakers recognised the limitations of existing measures 
for bringing about long term reductions in poverty. This finding is highly relevant for South Africa, 
where, rather than social grants providing one component of a broader package of anti-poverty 














specifically targeting the same households with multiple levels of intervention, linking programmes 
seem to offer sustainable impacts in a way that disparate parallel programmes cannot. 
 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 









were unable to 
generate 
sustainable 










causes of food 
insecurity rather 






In some cases cash transfers 
were insufficient and recipients 
used loans to buy food; 
 
Criticised for effectively 
excluding the very poorest by 
focusing on ‘productive poor’ 
and neglecting welfarist aspect 
of social protection in favour of 





were unable to 
reach the ‘hardcore 
poor’. A new 
approach was 
needed to graduate 






Adaptive to needs of 
beneficiaries and 




to the poorest of the 








The graduation objectives led 
to those deemed ‘hopeless’ 
being excluded; 
 
Access determined at 
community level - some 
evidence of patronage playing 
a role; 
 
Some women reported inability 
to recover from removal of 
food aid. They sold off assets, 
used loan for consumption and 




No existing national 
policy to support 
orphaned youth 
thus seeks to 
combine traditional 
family care with 
promotion of 
opportunities and 
reduce the burden 






Builds assets in the 




education to try to 
maximise the 
returns gained by 
orphans. 
 
Excludes those orphans that 
have already dropped out of 
school and might be most 
vulnerable. 
(Sources: Curley et al., 2009; Matin & Hulme, 2003; Gilligan et al., 2009; Andersson et al., 2010; Khandker, 
2005; Hashemi, 1996; Hossain, 2008; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009; Devereux et al., 2005; Sabates-
Wheeler & Devereux, 2010; Sharp et al., 2006; Ahmed, 2009; Hulme, 2006; Matin, 2004; Hashemi, 2001; 















A dominant theme emerging from these examples is that the design of projects and programmes 
must make concerted efforts to include the very poorest. Studies of the IGVGD programme found 
that the graduation model pursued, while making important gains in sustainable poverty 
reduction, had the side effect of excluding the very poorest households who were deemed 
incapable of creating productive assets. Similarly, Ethiopia’s PSNP has also been found to focus on 
the ‘productive poor’, to the detriment of the most vulnerable households unable to engage in 
productive activity; and the Suubi project, by design, excludes those orphans that have already 
been compelled to drop out of school. An important lesson to be drawn, then, is that there will 
always be a role for basic welfare provision for those unable to engage in income generation.  
 
Applying the conceptual framework of this study, linking programmes aim to supplement increased 
resources with positive impacts on the conversion of these into assets. If individuals have their 
conversion factors constrained by, for example, ill health or old age, their productive potential will 
be limited. If the CSG is to be linked with a promotional element, this must therefore remain an 
important add-on without changing the CSG to a ‘promotion-dependent’ grant. Furthermore, 
poverty reduction does not follow one defined path for everybody but occurs at different speeds 
and any successful poverty reduction programme must avoid converting slow progressors to 
‘dropouts’ (Matin & Hulme, 2003). 
 
In the IGVGD programme, a small proportion of participants experienced negative shocks during 
the programme cycle and were consequently unable to make repayments on their loans. Similarly, 
in the areas where the PSNP provided its safety net element in the form of food aid, it was not 
always sufficient, such that loans had to be used for food rather than productive investment. These 
findings provide a strong rationale for ensuring that when pursuing a linking approach, the 
protective component is adequate in order to provide a stable base on which the promotional 
elements can build assets. Moreover, escaping poverty is not a linear process but rather reverses 
can occur at any time and the safety net aspects must be available throughout the programme. 
Withdrawing protection too early risks reversing the gains made by increasing vulnerability and 
forcing participants into the very emergency coping strategies that these initiatives are designed to 
mitigate.  
 
7.3 OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE PROMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CSG 
 
The conceptual framework developed in Section 2 contends that assets are the principal means by 














set available is determined by both the ability to invest in assets and the returns that can be 
generated from those assets. Measures that attempt to link protection and promotion are 
therefore seeking to support a household’s initial endowments through protective measures while 
at the same time applying promotional measures to facilitate asset-building and, where possible, 
boost the likely returns on assets.  
 
The importance of maintaining sensitivity to local factors has been consistently demonstrated in 
the literature on development interventions and any new initiatives in South Africa would have to 
be carefully designed to complement the prevailing structural, cultural and socio-economic 
situation. Nevertheless, consideration of the examples discussed above and the prevailing policy 
environment in South Africa permits an initial attempt to formulate some potential options for 
enhancing the promotional ability of the CSG.  
 
Any thorough option appraisal must take as its starting point the ‘do nothing’ option. In this case, 
this represents the current CSG construction, which has been demonstrated to have little effect on 
long term asset-building. When comparing alternatives, then, policymakers should be interested in 
the additionality that new options can bring; that is, the extra benefit in terms of assets compared 
to any extra costs. An assessment of the relative costs and benefits of the various options is well 
beyond the scope of this paper, but rather this section seeks to outline a number of broad choices 
that may warrant further development.  
 
Options for incorporating a promotional component to the cash transfer of the CSG can be 
delineated in a number of dimensions. As noted in Section 2, assets vary in a number of ways and 
the types of assets that promotional measures aim to build are also likely to vary. Firstly, 
promotional measures could target the child directly and aim to build a strong asset base for the 
next generation; or target caregivers and seek to arrest the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty today. Options will also vary in terms of the likely magnitude and timescale of the benefit 
accrual, as well as in the fiscal costs of delivery. As a first step in exploring the possibility of 
complementing the cash transfer element of the CSG, the following discussion presents a range of 
potential promotional measures separated into those targeting the child directly and those 
focusing on generating household impacts while the child is still a child.  
 
7.3.1 Measures Targeting the Child 
 














Savings are a vital cushion against risk and allow poor households to develop an asset base to 
protect themselves against future income shocks. Financial assets can be built over time and 
transformed into other productive assets for self-development in the future (Zimmerman & 
Moury, 2009). Linking cash transfers with savings provision could thus offer significant scope for 
expanding the future choices available to recipient households. There are relatively few examples 
of such projects, although the concept is gaining ground in Latin America (ibid.).  
 
Supplementing the cash transfer with a child savings account would build financial capital in the 
child’s own name and provide family and friends with a formal method with which to save for the 
child’s future. Various sub-options could be examined, such as restricting access until the child 
completes high school; providing incentives to invest in assets, such as matching savings up to a 
certain level when savings are to be used for investing in productive assets; or complementing with 
financial education programmes sponsored by banks. The degree to which funds would be 
matched would of course have a major impact on the likely fiscal costs of this option. 
 
Following the rationale behind Uganda’s Suubi project, asset theory suggests that the existence of 
assets for their own development will increase the child’s optimism about the future and elicit 
more productive behaviour today. A savings account in the child’s name would also encourage the 
development of financial skills and knowledge as well as familiarity with the formal financial 
system which could bring benefits as the child reaches adulthood.  
 
An existing initiative, the Fundisa Fund, already exists to provide dedicated matched savings 
accounts for education and so linking CSG receipt with information about this existing opportunity 
could provide a powerful promotional element without the need to start a new programme from 
scratch. Fundisa, a partnership between government and the private sector, offers a bonus of 25 
per cent of the value saved, up to a maximum of R600 per year (Association for Savings and 
Investment South Africa, 2010). 
 
Option 2: Imposing Conditions 
 
The experience of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in Latin America is widely regarded as 
successful in generating long-term human capital development by incentivising behavioural 
changes in recipients. It has been demonstrated that, on the whole, the CSG income is spent in 
broadly the same way as other income rather than investing disproportionately in asset-building. If 
conditions were attached to CSG receipt, such as school enrolment or regular attendance at clinics, 














Despite the popularity of CCTs in Latin America, however, it is not clear that attaching conditions to 
cash transfers would be appropriate in South Africa, nor that the conditions themselves actually 
generate benefits exceeding their costs. Schubert and Slater (2006) argue that a number of 
important socio-cultural and structural factors may limit the success of CCTs being replicated 
outside of the Latin America region. The authors rightly acknowledge the absence of cost-benefit 
analyses to demonstrate that the conditions themselves are efficient before going on to outline 
some key issues that must be addressed if CCTs are to work in Africa.  
 
Crucially, imposing conditions such as school attendance or regular visits to medical clinics cannot 
be expected to generate significant improvements in human capital if access is constrained on the 
supply side rather than the demand side (Schubert & Slater, 2006). In this case, imposing 
conditions could actually be counterproductive by excluding households that are already 
disadvantaged by poor access to basic services. Realising the human capital benefits of health and 
education depends as much on quality as quantity, such that imposing conditions would require 
that adequate services are available to all citizens. However, a number of studies have found 
service delivery problems that raise questions about the suitability of imposing conditions on cash 
transfers (see for example Scott et al., 2008 on HIV-related health services; Coovadia et al., 2009 
on health systems in general; Van der Berg, 2008 on education).  
 
Moreover, regarding education, a common focus of CCTs, South Africa already has high rates of 
school enrolment, with a gross enrolment ratio27 of 98% in 2008 for primary and 84% for 
secondary (Republic of South Africa, 2010a: 8). It seems unlikely then that much additional benefit 
could be gained from imposing enrolment conditions, compared to the extra costs. In addition to 
the efficiency arguments against imposing conditions on South Africa’s social grants, it could also 
be argued that doing so would go against the country’s strong rights-based constitution.  
 
Given these arguments, it is somewhat surprising then that the National Government has decided 
to impose the condition of school enrolment as of Jan 1st 2010 (Republic of South Africa, 2010b). 
The human capital and fiscal effects of this condition remain to be seen; but given the preceding 
discussion, it is difficult to believe that the additional benefits will exceed the costs.  
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Option 3: Pay the cash transfer directly to the child 
 
Given that the CSG has recently been extended to cover children up to the age of eighteen, it is 
worth reflecting on the changing needs of children throughout the various stages of their youth. 
While infants undoubtedly require the care and nurturing of parents or caregivers, as children 
grow older and enter their teens, they tend to take on increasing responsibility for their own life 
course. There may thus be scope for differentiating grant provision at different stages of the child’s 
life. Paying the grant directly to the child after a certain age could foster independence and 
encourage the young person to think about their own development, as well as reducing pressure 
to drop out of school to look for work. This option could be combined with Option 1 by paying the 
grant directly into the child’s account.  
 
Option 4: Offer advice on careers, bursaries and tertiary education opportunities 
 
Providing financial assistance to young people can provide the means to invest in their future 
through education, training or starting a small business. Nevertheless, the existence of poverty 
traps indicates that an individual’s ability to do and to be is driven not only by the amount of 
money they have but also by the ability to overcome structural barriers. In Section 6.1, it was 
argued that imperfect information is an important market failure preventing efficient asset-
building. It follows that supplementing cash transfers with information and advice on the options 
open to young people in terms of further education, bursaries, training and employment could 
help to overcome this barrier and allow young people to make informed choices about their own 
future. This option could assist young people to pursue their own optimal asset-building strategy, 
as well as help to maximise the returns they can expect on the assets they possess. 
 
Despite the potential benefits of offering tailored advice to young CSG beneficiaries, government 
staff may not be the best candidates to impart the requisite technical knowledge. However, South 
Africa contains a wealth of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), non-profit companies and 
business leaders that are already providing similar services to disadvantaged young people, such 
that the actual provision could potentially be outsourced. An examination of the capacity of the 
NGO sector to effectively deliver such services would be a useful research activity if this option is 

















7.3.2 Measures Targeting Caregivers 
 
Option 5: Encourage recipients to receive grant electronically  
 
There is some evidence that simply paying a transfer into a bank account rather than as cash can 
encourage savings (Zimmerman & Moury, 2009). Regular saving, even if only small amounts, 
provides a number of benefits to poor households by building up financial assets that can function 
as a buffer against future income shocks. Savings can also be converted into other productive 
assets, such as children’s education, skills training or inputs to small business development.  
 
In order to encourage more grant recipients to open bank accounts, the banks themselves would 
have to offer more flexible and low-fee products. However an important trade-off exists between 
the extent of electronic transfers and contact time with recipients. As more people choose bank 
transfers, there will be fewer people visiting SASSA offices each month to wait in line and collect 
their cash. Given that this process provides the main contact opportunity with which to provide 
information about complementary measures offered, this may limit the potential of some of the 
other proposed options. 
 
Option 6: Ensure CSG recipients are aware of school fee exemptions 
 
Despite government policy automatically exempting CSG beneficiaries from school fees, the 
analysis of expenditure patterns find that CSG households still pay school fees, albeit less than non-
recipients. This suggests that recipients are not always aware of the exemption and may be 
spending more than they need to on education. Informing CSG recipients about additional 
entitlements is a low cost way to implicitly raise the value of the CSG, without actually increasing 
the grants budget.    
 
Option 7: Provide skills training  
 
Although not targeting households with children specifically, two of the case studies examined 
above focused on skills training to promote asset-building. These methods on the whole proved 
successful in bringing about sustained reductions in poverty and providing participants with the 
means to pursue their own development. Similar opportunities could be offered to the caregivers 
















Again, it is important to bear in mind the varying stages of child development as caregivers of very 
young children should be free to care for the child. However, once the child reaches school age, 
caregivers could be encouraged to engage in income generation in order to provide a source of 
earned income for the household and the means with which to construct a path out of poverty.   
 
Of course, offering skills training to the caregivers of all nine million CSG beneficiaries would 
represent a huge task for government; it would almost certainly be prohibitively expensive and it is 
unlikely that government would have the capacity to deliver nationally. However, many NGOs and 
faith-based organisations (FBOs) are already providing skills training. A more appropriate role for 
government in this regard would therefore be one of coordination and active dissemination of 
information to CSG recipients at the point of application or collection. 
 
Option 8: Microfinance  
 
A commonly cited barrier facing the poor is access to credit. The asset poverty trap literature 
highlights the problem of low asset bases generating low returns and thus low levels of investable 
capital such that poor households may be trapped with inefficiently low asset levels. Improved 
access to credit can provide the necessary seed capital required to start a small business or expand 
home-based production.   
 
While microfinance can provide poor households with the start up capital needed to pursue 
income generation activities and begin to lift themselves out of poverty, it should be borne in mind 
that the small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME) sector is by no means a panacea for poverty 
reduction. It is doubtful that these businesses can generate substantial reductions in 
unemployment and it is unlikely that the South African economy could absorb vast numbers of 
new micro businesses. Nevertheless, for some poor households, microfinance can fill a gap in the 




Some of the options proposed would require significant fiscal commitments, while others aim to 
raise the implicit value of the grant by increasing the ‘value added’ of grant provision by 
conceptualising the CSG as a gateway to other poverty reduction measures. Table 5 provides a 
brief summary of the options presented with an initial estimate of the types of assets promoted 














beyond the scope of this study and further research would be required if a full option appraisal 
was to be produced.  
 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF OPTIONS 










1. Child Savings Account 
 
Savings/ Education human 
capital  
Depends largely on matching level  
 
2. Imposing conditions 
 
Health or education human 
capital 
Determined by administrative costs of 
compliance  
3. Pay directly to the child 
 
Savings; 
Education human capital; Self 
esteem 
Additional recipients may increases 
administrative costs  













5. Encourage electronic 
receipt of grants 
Savings Possibly subsidising private banks 
6. Ensure recipients are 
aware of school fee 
exemption 
Savings  Dissemination of Information 
7. Provide skills training 
 
Education human capital; 
Self esteem 
Research on existing programmes, 
coordination and administration 
8. Microfinance 
 
Access to Credit; 
Human Capital; Productive 
Capital 
Start-up funds and coordination of 
expertise 
 
The poor are not a homogenous group and households will require a range of different measures 
to bring about sustained reductions in poverty. NGOs and other non-state actors already provide a 
range of services to disadvantaged South Africans. While national or local government may not 
possess a comparative advantage in the provision of certain promotional measures, such as skills 
training or business advice, there remains potential for government to assume a coordinating role 
and ensure that CSG recipients are better informed about services on offer in their area. Moreover, 
in considering options for supplementing the CSG, it will be important to recognise the varying 
needs of young people of different ages and ensuring appropriate sequencing of interventions to 
maximise the likely asset effects.  
 
Based on this initial scoping exercise, most of the options proposed offer some potential for 
further examination. Interestingly, despite Option 2 appearing to offer perhaps the least viable 
approach for South Africa, it is the only option that has actually been pursued, with a school 
enrolment condition being attached as of January 2010. Option 5 is the only other option that may 
not necessarily enhance the promotional capacity of the CSG as pursuing this option would limit 














The options likely to offer the lowest additional cost while still generating promotional benefits are 
Option 3, which essentially involves changing the direct recipient of the grant from caregiver to 
child without any additional alternations; and Options 4 and 6, both of which relate to linking CSG 
provision to enhanced information about existing complementary services. Option 1 could be 
pursued in a number of different ways and the viability would depend on the extent to which 
matching would be provided as well as the willingness of private financial institutions to provide 
banking services to children from poor families.  
 
Options 7 and 8 are both concerned with encouraging the caregivers of CSG-beneficiary children to 
pursue self-employment or gain new skills that could facilitate their access to wage employment. 
The success of these options would depend critically, arguably more than for the other options, on 
external macroeconomic and political factors creating appropriate e abling conditions. For 
example, skills training can provide the competencies required to successfully gain employment, 
but if there are simply no job opportunities available, or if the participants are unable to travel to 
the location of employment, then the programme is essentially redundant. Similarly with a 
microfinance scheme; access to credit is a major obstacle to the development of small and micro 
businesses but it is not the only one. Only when the local economy is able to absorb additional 
businesses and where the business manager possesses appropriate skills does a new micro 
business stand much chance of success. Combining elements of Options 7 and 8 may offer one way 
to strengthen their success but a careful study of the economic and political climate would be 
















8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Section concludes the study and summarises the recommendations made. It also reviews the 
areas for future research that have emerged during this work and some key limitations of the 
method applied.  
 
This study set out to achieve two main goals: developing a framework through which to assess the 
impact of South Africa’s Child Support Grant, and understanding the likely longer term effects of 
the CSG on poverty, specifically whether it can be said to address the underlying causes. In doing 
so, the fulfilment of six specific objectives, outlined in Section 1, guided the research throughout. 
To recap, these objectives were as follows, to: 
 
1. Examine the evolution of the concept of poverty; 
2. Critically assess the role of social protection in addressing poverty; 
3. Construct a logical and relevant conceptual framework within which to appraise the 
poverty impacts of South Africa’s social grants; 
4. Establish the current poverty situation in South Africa; 
5. Analyse the likely impact of CSG receipt on future poverty reduction in South Africa; 
6. Formulate options for enhancing the poverty impacts of the CSG. 
 
This concluding section will revisit these objectives, recapitulate the key findings of the research 
and summarise the recommendations flowing from the preceding case study review. This structure 
will allow the opportunity to reflect on whether the research objectives have indeed been met and 
whether the intended contribution of the study has been realised.   
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Despite a growing body of literature examining various socio-economic impacts of social grants, 
particularly the SOAP and the CSG, it remains the case that this literature lacks a clear and explicit 
discussion of exactly why these impacts are important, over and above the income support directly 
provided. The conceptual framework developed in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 2 thus 
proposed an ‘assets-augmented’ capabilities approach, which sees the ultimate end of anti-poverty 
measures as enhanced capabilities, where this is in turn achieved by increased asset holdings. 














grants, as the literature is currently concerned with, becomes much clearer. The construction of 
this framework directly achieved Objective 3, while Objectives 1 and 2 were addressed in the 
background analysis.  
 
To understand the potential for transitions out of poverty, static ‘snapshot’ information such as 
income may be inadequate. Focusing instead on the assets of the poor can provide a longer term 
assessment of the likelihood of households overcoming the underlying causes of poverty and 
‘graduating’ out. Assets provide benefits in excess of their financial value and represent a critical 
element of poverty reduction. Asset poverty traps can occur when those with low asset bases are 
unable to invest in increased asset stocks due to the very low returns on their existing asset 
portfolios and thus remain trapped in low asset equilibria. In order for any anti-poverty measure, 
including social protection, to successfully generate sustainable reductions in poverty it follows 
that asset bases must be boosted in the process. Only when the poor are able to increase their 
assets can they begin to tackle the underlying causes of poverty and in turn enhance their 
capabilities. It is in this argument that the rationale for examining a range of non-monetary grant 
impacts lies.  
 
In tackling Objective 4, it was found that South Africa has focused largely on a system of 
unconditional cash transfers to address poverty, with the CSG by far the largest in terms of 
numbers of beneficiaries. In order to assess whether this grant is addressing the causes or the 
symptoms of poverty, Objective 5, an examination of the asset-building behaviour of recipients 
was conducted by analysing the expenditure patterns of both CSG-recipient households and a 
comparable non-recipient group. Based on this analysis, it was not possible to conclude that the 
expenditure patterns of CSG households are significantly different from those of similar non-CSG 
households. It cannot thus be said that the CSG is generating greater asset-building as CSG 
recipients do not appear to engage in more asset-building expenditure than comparable non-
recipients. Instead, it appears that CSG income is treated broadly as other income and subsumed 
within the household budget. 
 
Following the terminology of the social protection literature, this empirical analysis implies that the 
CSG in its current form is ‘protective’ but not ‘promotional’ in that, while it provides much needed 
financial support to low-income households with children, it does not appear to increase a 
household’s ability to get ahead and actually improve their longer-term prospects. There is limited 
but growing international experience of explicitly linking protection and promotion to develop 














graduation out of poverty in the longer term. A brief examination of such experiences informed the 
attainment of Objective 6. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Motivated by the experiences of three specific programmes from Ethiopia, Bangladesh and 
Uganda, a number of options have been proposed for enhancing the promotional impacts of the 
CSG. The desirability of this objective flows from the conceptual framework developed in Section 2 
and the detailed rationale presented in Section 6. Without wishing to duplicate the discussion of 
Section 7, a common theme of the options explored is the pursuit of better linkages with existing 
government programmes and those of other providers of services for the poor. By ensuring that 
the CSG acts as a gateway to other complementary services and benefits, the value of the grant 
could be considerably increased with relatively little additional effort or cost. This is thus an 
important recommendation that has the potential to raise the implicit value of the CSG for 
beneficiaries without putting excessive pressure on the public purse.  
 
In addition to the options seeking greater coordination, a number of more interventionist 
measures were examined, some of which may warrant further investigation if it is deemed 
desirable for the CSG to bring about more promotional impacts for its beneficiaries. Among the 
most promising of these measures appears to be the introduction of Child Savings Accounts, paying 
the grant directly to the child beyond a certain age and providing skills training to the caregivers of 
poor children. Nevertheless, if complementary measures to extend the asset impact of the CSG are 
to be pursued, it will be important to bear in mind the heterogeneity of the poor and to ensure 
that a range of options are available in order that each household can choose the right path for 
their own unique situation.  
 
Ultimately, the combination of protective cash transfers and complementary promotional 
elements may be able to provide a platform on which to build more productive investments and 
cushion poor households against risk. However, the ability to fully graduate out of poverty will 
always be heavily influenced by the wider socio-economic context and the presence or absence of 
a range of enabling conditions. Of particular relevance in South Africa is the issue of 
unemployment. The availability of paid employment for the low- or unskilled is critical in 
determining the long term poverty trajectory. No social protection measure, regardless of how 
promotional its design, can achieve sustainable and comprehensive reductions in poverty in 














8.3 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
To build on the findings of this study, a number of areas for future research have been identified 
throughout the study and it is worth reflecting on these.  
 
It has been noted that the propensity score matching method examines average effects between 
two groups of households but cannot identify sub-patterns in expenditure within groups. If 
subgroups of treated households, such as dividing households by gender or age of CSG recipient, 
respond to the grant in different ways, this will not be captured within the analysis. It should 
however be noted that to do this using the same method would require redefining the matching 
strata to include the parameter of interest and this may lead to a situation of too few households 
in each stratum such that the analysis cannot be performed.  
 
While the method pursued provides a useful high level picture of the longer term poverty effects 
of the CSG, it would be valuable to add greater depth to these findings with some qualitative 
analysis of the grant-induced expenditure behaviour of specific households. Within the conceptual 
framework developed, it would be interesting to look beneath the surface and examine whether 
certain subgroups of CSG-recipient households do indeed consciously prioritise asset-building 
expenditure. 
 
The method followed in this study takes the household as the unit of analysis on the grounds that 
spending generally occurs at this level. However, it may be interesting to consider matching 
treated and control groups at the individual level in order to explore whether similar results are 
found.  
 
Given the relatively small size of the CSG compared to other social grants, it would also be 
informative to repeat this analysis for other larger cash transfers to examine whether similar 
results are found or whether significant differences in asset-building expenditures emerge when 
the size of the transfer is higher.  
 
One possible explanation for CSG households not spending significantly more than control 
households was that, in line with the permanent income hypothesis, treated households do not 
consider the grant to be permanent. As a result they may be saving the income. Empirical testing of 
the permanent income hypothesis would be a useful area for future work in order to shed some 















One of the options considered in Section 7 proposed outsourcing delivery of complementary 
promotional programmes to the NGO and non-profit sector. If this option is to be pursued, an 
analysis of the current impacts of this sector and the capacity to effectively deliver scaled-up 
services would be useful. Furthermore, this study has aimed to generate some initial options for 
further consideration, but before pursuing any new options for enhancing the promotional aspect 
of the CSG it will be vital to conduct a rigorous impact assessment of each of the proposed options.  
     
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
This study has a number of limitations that may influence the interpretation of the key findings and 
it is worth drawing these out more explicitly. Firstly, the purpose of the work was to evaluate the 
impact of the CSG on asset building. In the absence of clear and measurable data capturing asset 
formation directly, expenditure was used as a proxy for asset flows, however this may not be a 
perfectly appropriate proxy.  
 
Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of the propensity score matching method, it is not possible 
to eliminate all selection bias completely. It is therefore possible that the control group selected do 
not represent a sufficiently similar group of households.  
 
The method applied in this study examines flows of assets to consider the process of asset-
building, however asset stocks could also offer some useful insights into the effects of the CSG. 
Propensity score matching may not, however, be the best method for such an analysis as it would 
be difficult to conclude that any differences in asset stocks are generated by access to the CSG, as 
opposed to some external factor that makes both asset holdings and take-up of grants more likely 
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APPENDIX 1: PROPENSITY SCORE GRAPH 
 
Propensity Scores of Treated and Control Households 
 
 
The Stata PSGraph command (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003) was used to produce this graph of the 
propensity scores of treated and control households. The sections marked ‘off support’ represent 
those CSG-recipient households deemed to violate the common support assumption. This occurs 
when the propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum of the control 
households.   
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APPENDIX 2: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCING TESTS 
 
A2.1 Internal Balance Test 


























Monthly Income pre-CSG per adult 
equivalent (R) 2033.5 496.8 479.6 0.490 
Member experienced serious illness or 
injury in last 24 months  3.7% 2.8% 3.4% 0.310 
Province 
Western Cape 16.8% 6.7% 7.4% 0.455 
Eastern Cape 11.6% 17.0% 18.5% 0.236 
Northern Cape 7.2% 5.5% 4.8% 0.317 
Free State 6.1% 6.4% 5.8% 0.398 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 22.6% 29.9% 28.3% 0.275 
North West Province 7.9% 9.5% 9.5% 0.968 
Gauteng 11.5% 6.9% 7.0% 0.985 
Mpumalanga 6.1% 7.3% 6.9% 0.627 
Limpopo 10.2% 10.7% 12.0% 0.227 
Geo-Type 
Rural Formal  10.5% 7.2% 6.9% 0.766 
Tribal Authority Areas 35.4% 52.5% 52.8% 0.879 
Urban Formal 47.9% 33.2% 33.1% 0.954 






















Age 50.6 49.6 49.8 0.797 
Participates in community group(s) 21.2% 17.9% 17.1% 0.694 
Number of years schooling 7.0 5.5 5.5 0.826 
Employment Status 
Not Economically active 35.3% 42.6% 42.8% 0.931 
Unemployed 9.1% 15.5% 14.1% 0.258 
Employed 55.6% 41.9% 43.1% 0.468 
Perceived health status 
Excellent 22.4% 18.0% 17.3% 0.622 
Very good 20.6% 20.1% 20.9% 0.537 
Good 26.9% 24.5% 23.5% 0.500 
Fair 18.7% 22.3% 23.4% 0.407 
Poor 11.4% 15.2% 14.8% 0.734 
Relationship Status of Household Head 
Married or Living with Partner  53.1% 46.8% 46.9% 0.929 
Widow/ Widower 18.1% 24.2% 24.2% 0.987 
Divorced/Separated 4.4% 3.7% 3.4% 0.603 
Never Married 24.3% 25.4% 25.5% 0.919 
Composition of Household 
Household Size  4.2 5.5 5.4 0.915 
Number of Children aged 0-6 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.601 
Number of Children aged 7-14 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.510 
Number of Youths aged 15-18 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.945 
Number of Adults aged 18-39 1.6 1.8 1.8 0.733 
Number of Adults aged 40-59 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.501 














A2.2 External Balance Tests  










No religion 9.4% 10.4% 9.7% 0.486 
Christian 84.5% 84.1% 84.0% 0.956 
Jewish 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.221 
Muslim 0.9% 0.1% 0.2% 0.156 
Hindu 1.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.157 
African traditional spiritual beliefs 3.9% 5.2% 5.6% 0.544 
Presence of street lighting near dwelling 
Yes, currently working 41.0% 27.9% 26.4% 0.303 
Yes, currently not in working condition 5.8% 6.2% 5.3% 0.249 
No 53.1% 65.9% 68.3% 0.123 
Dwelling Type 
Brick structure on separate stand/yard/ farm  
 
65.4% 56.4% 56.1% 0.844 
Traditional structure made of traditional 
materials  
 
14.8% 24.9% 25.2% 0.815 
Informal dwelling not in backyard  
 
6.4% 7.3% 8.6% 0.163 
Flush or Chemical Toilet 55.4% 35.9% 36.9% 0.533 
Distance to nearest water supply  
Less than 100m 43.1% 41.5% 40.6% 0.729 
100m - less than 200m 27.1% 27.6% 27.2% 0.848 
200m - less than 500m 15.1% 13.5% 14.6% 0.509 
500m - less than 1km 8.0% 9.6% 11.2% 0.300 
1km or more 6.6% 7.8% 6.3% 0.258 
Non-resident family member died in last 24 
months 13.9% 12.3% 11.9% 0.683 
Positive event in household in last 24 months 11.5% 8.0% 6.9% 0.228 
Negative event in household in last 24 
months 7.5% 6.9% 7.2% 0.792 
 
Positive includes: a new job; inheritance; large gift; lottery winnings; large payout from firm; and 
scholarship.  
 
Negative includes: widespread death and disease of livestock; major crop failure; reduction in hours of main 
financial provider; loss of job of main financial provider; and theft fire or destruction of household property. 
 

























A2.3 Internal Balance Test with Survey Weights Applied 


























Monthly Income pre-CSG per adult 
equivalent (R) 2804.2 526.1 497.7 0.446 
Member experienced serious illness or 
injury in last 24 months  5.0% 3.3% 3.9% 0.756 
Province 
Western Cape 10.4% 4.4% 7.2% 0.051 
Eastern Cape 12.6% 18.5% 21.4% 0.284 
Northern Cape 2.2% 2.0% 1.5% 0.131 
Free State 5.7% 6.8% 5.0% 0.089 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 22.3% 21.6% 19.7% 0.488 
North West Province 7.0% 6.9% 8.6% 0.308 
Gauteng 20.7% 17.7% 14.6% 0.248 
Mpumalanga 7.3% 7.8% 7.2% 0.706 
Limpopo 11.8% 14.2% 15.0% 0.753 
Geo-Type 
Rural Formal  6.6% 6.2% 4.7% 0.260 
Tribal Authority Areas 34.9% 45.9% 47.3% 0.661 
Urban Formal 47.7% 35.0% 35.4% 0.900 






















Age 48.5 46.7 47.4 0.402 
Female 43.5% 62.5% 65.2% 0.381 
Participates in community group(s) 20.3% 22.0% 17.7% 0.281 
Number of years schooling 7.2 6.5 6.4 0.785 
Employment Status 
Not Economically active 33.7% 36.8% 40.2% 0.294 
Unemployed 12.3% 17.9% 17.5% 0.883 
Employed 54.1% 45.3% 42.3% 0.355 
Perceived health status 
Excellent 23.6% 21.4% 21.5% 0.954 
Very good 22.4% 22.2% 23.4% 0.673 
Good 24.6% 24.0% 19.4% 0.046 
Fair 17.9% 19.1% 22.0% 0.318 
Poor 11.6% 13.3% 13.7% 0.881 
Relationship Status 
Married or Living with Partner  53.9% 48.2% 46.3% 0.574 
Widow/ Widower 16.6% 21.4% 18.9% 0.336 
Divorced/Separated 4.5% 4.1% 4.2% 0.945 
Never Married 25.0% 26.3% 30.6% 0.174 
Composition of Household 
Household Size  5.3 5.3 5.5 0.410 
Number of Children aged 0-6 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.318 
Number of Children aged 7-14 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.674 
Number of Youths aged 15-18 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.965 
Number of Adults aged 18-39 2.1 1.9 1.9 0.926 
Number of Adults aged 40-59 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.562 
















APPENDIX 3: SUBGROUP EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS  
 
Expenditure Category Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
 
Food 
   
Cereals and pulses -0.72 (6.21) 
Meat, fish and eggs   -6.22 (4.76) 
Fruit, vegetables and dairy -1.57 (2.17) 
Fats and oils   -0.64 (1.51) 
Non alcoholic drinks    -0.76 (1.33) 
Eating outside the home -0.14 (1.03) 
Biscuits, cakes and confectionary   -1.01 (0.19) 
Other food    -1.97 (2.90) 
   
Non Food 
   
School materials    -1.31 (7.34) 
   
Curative healthcare -4.65 (2.99) 
Preventative healthcare 0.22 (0.55) 
















APPENDIX 4: EFFECTS OF PRE-CSG AND CSG INCOME ON 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER ADULT EQUIVALENT 
 
Following the method of Case and Deaton (1998), this table presents the OLS regression results where the 
expenditure output categories are regressed on pre-CSG income and CSG income controlling for the 
standard socio-demographic variables used throughout. This method aims to test whether CSG income is 
spent in broadly the same way as other income. The lack of significant differences indicates that CSG 
recipients do indeed treat their grant income in much the same way as other income sources. Education is 
the only expenditure category that returns a significant result, although this significance is very weak such 




Pre CSG Income 
(2) 
CSG Income 
F-test on joint significance 
of coefficients in (1) and 
(2) 







S.E. Prob > F 
Total Expenditure  0.25 0.068 0.59 0.20 0.109 
      
Food 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.187 
Housing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.490 
Clothing 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.259 
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.876 
Education 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.083 
Utilities 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.255 
Transport 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.492 
Insurance 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.397 
Household items -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.829 
Leisure 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.766 
Alcohol, tobacco 
and gambling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.820 
Miscellaneous 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.463 

















APPENDIX 5: FINANCIAL ASSETS OF TREATED AND CONTROL 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Asset Percentage of Households containing at least one 
member reporting ownership of asset 
Treated Control 
Personal loan from a bank 4.8% 2.9% 
Personal loan from a micro-lender 0.6% 0.5% 
Loan with a Mashonisa 2.3% 1.6% 
Study loan with a bank 0.7% 0.2% 
Study loan with another institution 0.2% 0.5% 
Vehicle Finance 1.4% 1.4% 
Credit card 2.5% 4.1% 
Bank account 46.9% 38.3% 
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